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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to develop the foundation and structure for a virtue ethics
theory grounded in a specific notion of care. While there has been a recent revival of
interest in virtue ethics theory, the theory has its roots in Aristotle’s work as well in the
medieval writings of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas worked out many of Aristotle’s ideas in
much more detail. However, while Aquinas offers a very rich and compelling ethical
theory, it is problematic because it is very tightly wrapped in his theology. A key
component in Aquinas’s theory is charity. Charity is one of Aquinas’s theological
virtues, which express the relationship between humans and God. Charity is the love of
God and of neighbor and he construes it as the foundation for all the other virtues. My
thesis explores the idea of replacing charity with the virtue of care. The virtue of care to
be used in this essential role is primarily based on recent work on the ethics of care by
Nel Nodding. The virtue of care, as I develop it, combines three interrelated parts:
instinctive, maternal and relational care. By comparing and contrasting care and charity,
I demonstrate that the virtue of care can fill the role of charity. In this capacity care can
serve as a naturalistic foundation for a virtue ethics theory. Since the ethics of care is
relatively new, it has yet to take shape. I propose building a care-based virtue ethics
theory on the structure of Aquinas’s theory. This new care-based virtue ethics theory
also benefits from utilizing many of the components of Aristotle’s theory which are
found in Aquinas’s work. My argument is that care can fulfill the role of charity in
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Aquinas’s theory. Care-based virtue ethics theory is a completely naturalistic version of
Aquinas’s virtue ethics theory. My thesis contains both the foundation for this different
kind of care-based virtue ethics theory and some direction for future work on revising
Aquinas’s theory using the virtue of care. The essence of this care-based virtue ethics
theory is captured in the notion I outline of a virtuoso human.

iii

Chapter 1: Introduction
The intent of this thesis is to develop the foundation and conceptual framework
for a virtue ethics theory based on care. I start by extracting components of Aristotle’s
discussion regarding the nature of a virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics and looking at
them from a perspective different from his original intent. The second step is to take
from Aquinas’s work certain aspects of his notion of charity and the function it serves in
his theory. Finally, I develop the concept of care as a virtue, based primarily on the work
of Nel Noddings. This notion of care has three connected aspects. First, there is an
instinctive element of care related to human animal nature. This instinctive aspect is the
basis of a second, more sophisticated notion of care, based on maternal care. Finally,
maternal care serves as the source of a strong notion of relational care. These three
concepts form the virtue of care to serve as the foundation of a care-based virtue ethics
theory. I argue that this conception of care functions in a manner similar to how Aquinas
utilizes the virtue of charity in his theory.

I then present the outline of a care-based

virtue ethics theory which I believe can be constructed around this foundational role for
care. I propose that this structure is conceptually supported by Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s
ethical theories.
I argue that a properly conceived virtue ethics theory, based on care, will both
have structural integrity and be useful. As a theory, it is based on sound principles and
logically consistent. Care can be justified as a naturalistic first principle. It can function
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as a universal foundational principle in a manner similar to aspects of Aquinas’s charity.
With care in the role of charity, it will then be possible to reworked Aquinas’s theory as a
wholly naturalistic theory. The virtue of care also integrates well with, and enhances the
role Aristotle assigns to his central virtue of prudence, which will maintain an important
role in this care-based virtue ethics theory. However, the most important aspect of this
care-based virtue ethics theory is found in is its application. In combination with the
mechanics of certain parts of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s virtue ethics theories, care can be
a powerful aid in moral decision making and taking action. I propose that the virtue of
care can provide strong motivation for ethical behavior. It can be easily understood and
applied to specific moral situations. The virtue of care can be taught and habituated in
the manner of an Aristotelian moral virtue. However, more than simply being taught,
care can be instilled in children. Aquinas conceives charity as something which is
infused into an individual. I believe that this conception of charity can provide a very
useful analogy related to how care can be instilled into an individual.
While my intent is to develop the outline for an ethical theory, I also suggest
certain areas where it may be possible to address moral development. In this thesis, I
focus on a very narrow area of the recent literature surrounding the ethics of care. There
are many different books and articles that I do not have the space to examine herein,
which explore aspects of the connection between care and moral education. In addition, I
do not make a specific argument for every possible issue which may be encountered
along the way. I do point in directions worthy of exploring in more depth in the future.
For example, I do not endeavor to provide a specific and comprehensive list of virtues or
do a detailed examination of the relationship between care and specific virtues. Rather,
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one direction worthy of exploring in the future would be the question of the unification of
the virtues. Could care, in the place of charity, unify the virtues in a sense similar to what
Aquinas intends? My focus in this thesis is on the heart of virtue ethics theory which is
the conceptualization and functioning of the virtues. The central part of this thesis is to
explore how the functions of one particular powerful divine virtue, charity, can be
accomplished by a related naturalistic concept, care. Care can play a fundamental role in
virtue ethics, similar to aspects of the role Aquinas ascribes to charity in his discussion of
it in the Disputed Questions on the Virtues (DQV). Aquinas’s foundational role for
charity is based on his notion of it as “(i) the form of the virtues, (ii) their moving cause,
and (iii) their root.”1 In using care in this role, in place of charity, it is possible that
Aquinas’s theory can be reworked as naturalistic virtue ethics theory, without the
theological elements.

1

Williams, Thomas and Atkins, E.M., Editors, Thomas Aquinas Disputed Questions on Virtues,

124.
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Chapter 2: Ethics
Up until about 40 years ago, moral theory was dominated by Kantian inspired
deontology and utilitarianism based on the work of Bentham and Mill.1 Both of these
theories offer general notions of what constitutes an ethical action. Deontology usually
takes its start from the notion that an action is ethical if and only if it is in accord with a
correct rule or principle. From that point forward different deontological theories focus
on determining the correct rules or principles. Various versions of deontology are
constructed around different assumptions regarding how to ground the moral rules.
There is usually some form of obligation or duty involved, which requires an individual
to follow the rule. Utilitarianism generally takes as its starting point the notion that an
action is ethical if and only if it promotes the best consequences.2 The various utilitarian
theories have different principles about how to promote the best consequences and how
the best consequences are to be determined. Consequences are often defined as some
version of the best outcomes that will make the most people happy in some way. There
are many different varieties of both of these theories, with an assortment of different
premises and principles. Both theories also have well documented general strengths and
weaknesses. One of the primary advantages of these two types of ethical theories is that
they appear to be easy to use for determining what action an individual should take. A
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See discussion in the introduction to Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 1.
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See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 26.
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person simply needs to adhere to a rule or he just takes the action which will have the
best consequences. However, this is not as simple as it sounds. It is not easy to find a
rule for every situation an individual may encounter. Furthermore, rules always seem to
have exceptions which are determined by circumstances. A rule such as always tell the
truth might not apply if a person was hiding an innocent person from a potential killer.
The notion of determining the best consequences includes the basic problem of predicting
the future. All of the ramifications of an action can never be foreseen in order to
determine whether or not the best consequences are achieved. The more complex
discussions in utilitarianism centers around the problem of determining what are the best
consequences and for whom do they apply These are application problems, referring to
the difficulty encountered by an individual when putting the theory to use in taking a
specific action.
Conceptually, deontological and utilitarian theories also give the appearance of
having integrity in their theoretical structures. They both seem to have well grounded
first principles and logical consistency. Deontology has a rule book and an individual
follows it. Utilitarianism has measurements of happiness and once the calculus is done
the answer should be apparent. However, as Rosalind Hursthouse points out, both of
these ethical theories have problems with their foundational principles and logical
arguments. Deontology must determine “which moral rules or principles are the correct
ones” and the reasoning behind why an individual has a duty or obligation to follow the
rule.1 Utilitarianism must determine what constitutes a good consequence. Also,
utilitarian theorists are faced with the problem that “different cultures, different

1

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 33.
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individuals, have different ideas of happiness.”1 It is very difficult to define “precisely
and correctly that ‘happiness’ we are supposed to be maximizing.”2 Utilitarian theories
also have another more significant problem. Defining what is ethical as ‘the best
consequences’ or ‘the greatest happiness’ for the most people opens the door for the
possibility that there are no moral prohibitions. If an action makes enough people happy,
it would be considered moral, no matter how abhorrent it may seem.3 A more serious
problem for both of these theories is found in the many different arguments which have
been made, by a variety of authors, that some of the major moral failings of the 19th and
20th centuries may have occurred as a result of a general reliance on these two approaches
to morality.4
In response to these and other shortcomings of utilitarian and deontological
theories, virtue ethics has arisen as a third major ethical approach. Hursthouse points that
in the short time since its recent modern revival virtue ethics “has acquired full status,
recognized as a rival to deontological and utilitarian approaches, as interestingly and

1

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 34

2

Ibid., 34
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This oversimplification of the potential problem has been addressed since the very origins of the
theory with Bentham and Mill. As George Sher points out, “at first glance, Mill’s greatest-happiness
principle may seem to imply that society should interfere with people’s libertied whenever such
interference will maximize the overall happiness.” Classics of Western Philosophy (2006), 1057, Hackett
Publishing Company. However, Mill argues that there must be an accounting of justice in the actions so
that, for example as he argues in On Liberty, the only time a government should exercise power against the
will of the individual is when he may harm others. Others like John Austin and Henry Sidgwick have also
made arguments rebutting this claim.
4

This conclusion has been stated in many different ways, but I think Alasdair MacIntyre
summarized it well in After Virtue (1984). He captures a possible root of this problem with the comment
that “ever since belief in Aristotelian teleology was discredited moral philosophers have attempted to
provide some alternative rational secular account of the nature and status of morality, but that all these
attempts, various and variously impressive as they have been, have in fact failed, a failure perceived most
clearly by Nietzsche.” 256.

6

challengingly different from either as they are from each other.” 1 While there are still
some who argue that virtue ethics is more a term of art than a viable ethical theory, the
volume of recent literature would indicate that at a minimum it has acquired an important
position in the current ethical dialogue.2

Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics generally refers to an approach to ethics “according to which the
basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character.”3 Character basically refers to
a specific collection of traits an individual has which are in the form of dispositions to
act. People have different levels of habitual action, ranging from infrequent mild
tendencies to deeply ingrained habitual routines and instinctive like behavior. A
character trait is a strong disposition or tendency to act regularly in a specific manner.
Dispositions to act ethically, which have developed into character traits, are called
virtues. Obviously, virtues are at the center of virtue theory. Different versions of virtue
ethics theories address various aspects of character and a variety of different collections

1

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 2.

2

Elizabeth Anscombe is frequently credited with one of the first entries in the modern revival of
virtue ethics theory with her 1958 article “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Martha Nussbaum presents an
argument that virtue ethics is not an ethical theory in general and argues that what is often presented as a
VE theory is actually a confused story. That VE is not a standalone ethical theory nor is it a cohesive
alternative and is often presented by its proponents as “radically anti-theoretical.” Nussbaum, Martha,
“Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category,” 164.
3

Statman, Daniel, Virtue Ethics, 7. Stateman has a good discussion of this characterization. He
refers to two authors of articles in Virtue Ethics (1997): David Solomon 165 and Peter Simpson, 245. He
also refers to discussions by: Schneewind, Jerome B. (1990) “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” Ethics 101, 43;
Baier, Kurt (1988) “Radical Virtue Ethics,”, in French et al., 127; Slote, Michael (1993) “Virtue Ethics and
Democratic Values,” Journal of Social Philosophy 24, 15; Van Inwagen, Peter (1990) “Response to Slote,”
Social Theory and Practice 16, 392; Dreier, James (1993) “Structures of Normative Theories,” Monist 76,
34; McDowell, John (1979) “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 62, 331.
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of virtues categorized in various ways. One way of understanding the parts of a virtue
ethics theory is to think of going in two directions from the central notion of a virtue.
One part of the theory requires a look upward from the virtue to understand the guiding
or central principles of the theory. This involves determining what makes a disposition a
virtue, what excellent dispositions are on the list of ethical virtues and what a person
needs to qualify for having the proper collection for his or her character to be considered
virtuous. The other direction goes downward from the virtue to the action an individual
takes and involves determining what actions are ethical and how they emanate from the
virtue.
For example, one issues of concern is whether or not virtues can be independent
of actions. Can an individual who appears to have the virtue of honesty take a dishonest
action in a specific situation? The strongest position, sometimes attributed to Aristotle, is
that it is not possible for the ethical status of the disposition and the action to be separate
in the fully virtuous person. A virtuous person is someone who has reached the highest
level of excellence in his moral dispositions. A person is virtuous if and only if every
action they take in the sphere of morality is ethical and comes from his virtue. Another
associated component of the relation between virtue and action is the notion that it is the
virtue, the disposition, which justifies right conduct. An action is virtuous if and only if it
is the one done by the virtuous person, from the proper disposition. For example, an
action is honest if it is what an honest person would do. What is meant by this distinction
if that the intent of an individual determines the moral status of the act. If a person takes
an honest action by accident, or because it will injure another person, it is not considered
a virtuous action. This facet of the virtuous action is similar in certain aspects to the
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deontological approach. In deontological theory the agent acts because of the rule. An
action is ethical because it is an application of the rule and the agent acts out of a duty to
follow the rule. The outcome of the action does not matter. In deontological theory the
rule determines the moral status of the act. In virtue ethics theory the virtue determines
the moral status of the act. Both the virtue and deontological approaches are opposed to
the utilitarian method, where the outcome of the action determines its moral status. If an
individual followed the proper rule or acted from a virtue, and due to circumstances
outside his control there was a bad result, the action would be unethical in an utilitarian
theory.
A virtue ethics theory must address the foundational principles upon which to call
a particular, disposition, character trait or collection of traits ethical. In many virtue
theories, the virtues generally are thought to derive their justification from the principle
that they are necessary for, and possibly constitutive of, the flourishing of the individual
and perhaps some form of human societal flourishing in general.1 The foundation for
virtue ethics is also usually built upon a naturalistic element, related to the notion of
flourishing. The virtues are part of a characteristically natural flourishing human life. As
a part of an individual’s nature there is some kind of harmony found within the fully
virtuous person, so that he does the right thing naturally, without internal conflict.2 For
example, in certain virtue ethics theories, this conflict is considered to be between the

1

See Statman, Daniel, Virtue Ethics, 8. For this discussion Statman References Hursthouse
(1995), “A virtue is a character trait that human beings, given their physical and psychological nature, need
to flourish (or to do and fare well).” 68.
2

See Statman, Daniel, Virtue Ethics, 15-16. For this discussion Statman refers to two authors in
his Virtue Ethics (1997): Gary Watson, 62-66 and David Solomon, 166, as well as Swanton, Christine
(1995) “Profiles of the Virtues,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76, 60; Jerome B. Schneewind, “The
Misfortunes of Virtue,” Ethics, 101 (1990), 43.
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reasoning part of a person, and his animal or emotional desires. The conflict and
harmony can take different forms. In addition, the principles of virtue ethics are usually
located in the naturalistic world of human experience and require no claim to some other
realm. However, the notions of flourishing or happiness can vary. For example, Aquinas
classifies Aristotle’s notion of natural happiness as something earthly and postulated that
there is also a divine happiness found in union with God. Other theories have been built
on a Platonic type of foundation and ground the virtues or happiness somewhere else, like
a Kantian realm of ends or Nicolai Hartmann’s similar realm of values.1
This generic synopsis of virtue ethics captures some of the common principles of
different approaches to virtue ethics. Much of virtue ethics theory is built on an
Aristotelian foundation. There have been a fair number of articles, and books with
collections of articles, related to various parts virtue ethics, such as Statman’s Virtue
Ethics (1997), which I have been using as a reference. In addition, many different texts,
such as Philippa Foot’s Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (1978)
address aspects of virtue ethics and usually relate them to specific ethical problems, such
as abortion or euthanasia. While there has been a lot of recent interest in virtue ethics, I
intend to follow the path set out by Rosalind Hursthouse in her 1998 On Virtue Ethics.
As she points out, her text was one of the first “which explores virtue ethics
systematically and at length.”2 Another of the first modern in-depth texts on the subject
is Michael Slote’s From Morality to Virtue (1992). Slote has more recently added to his
1

See W. H. Werkmeister (1990), Nicolai Hartmann’s New Ontology, particularly chapter VI for a
discussion of Hartmann’s Ethics (1932/33). Werkmeister gives a good summary of Hartmann’s 746 page
book, which is a virtue ethics theory based on Kant’s work and grounded in the “realm of moral values,”
196.
2

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 5.
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work on virtue ethics, with the publication of Morals from Motives (2001). These all
start with similar expositions of the subject. The first step is to differentiate virtue ethics
from deontological and utilitarian theories. The second step is to define a specific virtue
ethics theory.1 Both Hursthouse and Slote state that they are each espousing a “particular
version”2 or “specific form”3 of virtue ethics. I need to give a brief account of the
different directions of each of these works, and why I chose to follow Hursthouse’s
approach.
Slote’s initial approach in From Morality to Virtue is directed more toward the
theoretical and abstract, offering the “foundations for a general account of a specific form
of virtue ethics, one that is sufficiently oriented to conceptual/structural issues and
specific about what counts as a virtue to enable us to compare its merits with those of
currently dominant approaches to ethics.”4 He takes a more agent-based approach to
virtue ethics which is focused more on “the virtuous character of virtuous individuals
than in the actions of individuals” and more on being “grounded in aretaic concepts of
goodness and rightness.”5 His virtue ethics follows the thinking of some more modern
philosophers such as Martineau, Christian Swanson and aspects of Nietzsche, rather than
Aristotle.6 He built on this theoretical approach and movement away from Aristotle’s

1

Deontological and utilitarian theories also wrestle with these two subjects, finding some of their
own identity as theories in the differences between each other and trying to determine their own
foundations and content.
2

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 5.

3

Slote, From Morality to Virtue, xiv.

4

Ibid., xiv.

5

Ibid., xiv.

6

See Hursthouse discussion, On Virtue Ethics, 8.
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approach in Morals from Motives. However, an important aspect of his second text is
that it is directed at a developing the ethics of care into a “warm, agent-based VE theory
of individual morality.”1
While I do believe that Slote provides some valuable insight in both of these
works, because he takes a more theoretical approach, I do not intend to follow his
approach. This is both because I intend to follow Aristotle and because the goal for the
theory I am developing is for it to be simple and applicable. By his own admission,
Slote’s approach is problematic on both accounts. As he points out in his introductory
comments “this present book deliberately avoids patterning its ideas on Aristotle,”
arguing that at times “the historical Aristotle seems irrelevant” to some of the ethical
problems of the modern world.2 From Slote’s perspective “Aristotle seems to focus more
on the evaluation of agents and character traits than on the evaluation of actions.”3 He
also states that the account of caring he has offered is “somewhat complex” and
problematic in that “it might well be asked how anyone could be expected to carry such a
complicated (or philosophically sophisticated?) view around in her head and guide her
life by it.”4 He goes on to discuss that his account is something which could be used to
measure motivation and conduct, not necessarily to guide action. During the second
phase of my project, reconstructing Aquinas’s theory based on care, I will return to
address Slote. In particular, he has a good discussion of the relationship between care
and justice, which will be helpful in evaluating other virtues. However, my focus is on
1

Stohr and Wellman, “Recent Work on Virtue Ethics,” 49.

2

Slote, Morals from Motives, vii.

3

Ibid., 5.

4

Ibid., 88.
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developing a practical theory, based on Aquinas’s work which is founded on Aristotle’s
theory. In this thesis, which is the first phase of my overall project of rebuilding
Aquinas’s theory, I intend to follow Hursthouse in the direction I take in creating the
foundation and structure for this version of a care-based virtue ethics theory.
Hursthouse offers an approach which is “more concerned with details, examples
and qualifications.”1 She defines her approach as neo-Aristotelian because, as is
commonly acknowledged, Aristotle was wrong about certain things like slaves and
women, but also because she does not want to be restricted to his narrow list of virtues.2
While she adopts many of the notions of Aristotle from the Nicomachean Ethics, she
states that in certain regards she is launching out on her own. She believes this approach
is necessary because what she imports from Aristotle is not only subject to interpretation
and the “history of ideas” but also needs to be modernized.3 Since I will initially follow a
similar approach, importing components of Aristotle’s work, I will not elaborate on her
overall theory. However, I will introduce what she has brought in from Aristotle as a
lead into a discussion of his theory. Hursthouse discusses five main ideas from Aristotle.
The first two are his conception of eudaimonia and concept of virtue (or vice). The third
is Aristotle’s distinction between acting from reason, which is the rational wanting or
desire of adults, and the “mere passion or desire that impels the other animals and small
children” in what they do when they act.4 The fourth piece she uses from Aristotle is
that she finds his theory hospitable to the notion that beliefs and desires are not separate
1

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 5.

2

Ibid., 8.

3

Ibid., 9.

4

Ibid., 14.
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distinct parts of human nature. Many modern ethical theories hold that belief and desire
have very different roles in decisions and actions, and these theories struggle with this
issue. Aristotle’s concept of choice (prohairesis) can be “either desiderative intellect or
intellectual desire.”1 Finally, she highlights the insight had into the cultivation of virtues
in children. I will follow Hursthouse’s approach and I plan to draw on several of the
insights in Hursthouse’s book.
I also plan to discuss some of the problems with virtue ethics theories in several
parts. First, I plan to follow a specific path through the Nicomachean Ethics with a
particular objective in mind. While I do intend to be consistent with Aristotle’s work, I
do not intend to provide a definitive account of exactly what he means in each area I
discuss. Rather, my goal is to extract useful parts of his theory which address some of
the problems of virtue ethics theory, along with some of Hursthouse’s insights. I will
also discuss how Aquinas addresses some of the problems with virtue ethics theory based
on portions of his work. In particular, my goal is to try to remove the theological aspects
of Aquinas’s work, while maintaining the valuable components, and reformulate it in a
naturalistic fashion. I will build on my interpretation of some of Aristotle’s and
Aquinas’s important concepts with the intention of using them as components for
constructing a care-based virtue ethics theory. I will then develop a notion of care which,
when combined with these components will provide the foundation and structural for a
sound virtue ethics theory which begins to address the basic problems.

1

Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 16.
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Chapter 3: Aristotle’s Virtue
The ethics of Aristotle is about human action and the decisions involved. At the
beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) he states that “every action and decision,
seems to seek some good” (1094a1-5).1 He goes on in this first book to discuss how
some actions are means to other ends while some things “achievable by action have some
end we wish for because of itself” (1094a18). Aristotle argues that the end we seek for
itself, which is the highest good, is eudaimonia. This highest good is the ultimate end of
the actions which he is investigating. Eudaimonia is a form of happiness which “more
than anything else, seems complete without qualification” (1097a34-35). While a lot of
the commentary on Aristotle’s work focuses on the nature of this end, Terence Irwin, in
his footnotes to this important opening book of the NE, provides a reminder of the
significance Aristotle places on the action component of his theory. Aristotle has four
different classifications for human pursuits which are directed to some goal. Three of
these pursuits, crafts, types of production and lines of inquiry, seem to aim at goals which
go beyond the activity itself and the exercise of the activity. However, Aristotle sets out
to develop an understanding of the special kind of action that “includes ACTIVITY that

1

Irwin, Terence, Translator (1999), Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana. I will use this translation throughout and reference the quotes from it with the
Bekker numbers.
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does not aim at any end beyond itself.”1 Certain actions which are “chosen for their own
sakes are among the things chosen for the sake of some end, and hence (he will go on to
argue) for the sake of some ultimate end.”2 Throughout the NE Aristotle develops,
expands and elaborates on the relationship between the action and the end. As Irwin
notes, Aristotle’s work in the NE includes both an effort to “describe and understand the
highest good and to prescribe ways to achieve it.”3 What follows will be a brief outline
of parts of the theory he built in the NE around his conception of virtue and the related
action. In particular, I want to focus on both Aristotle’s characterization of a virtue and
the relationship he develops between virtue and action. Aristotle classified virtues into
two broad groupings, the moral and the intellectual. I will first discuss the moral virtues
and then give a brief account of the intellectual virtues both for completeness and for
developing a better understanding of one of the most important virtues in his theory,
prudence. Prudence and the moral virtues are the primary ethical components in his
theory.
The dichotomy between the moral and intellectual virtues is based on Aristotle’s
account of the human soul. One part of the human soul is non-rational and one part is
rational. He further categorizes the non-rational part into two more groupings. The first
part has to do with the many bodily functions that are found in plants and other animals,
such as the biological or chemical operation of the kidneys or digestive systems. Other
parts are shared just with the animals, such as vision or other sensory perceptions. These
1

Irwin, Translator, Nicomachean Ethics, 172. As Irwin points out, ACTIVITY in the sense
related to virtue is identical to action. While both action and activity are used in several senses in the NE,
in relation to the virtues, “he ascribes to each virtue a distinctive range of actions.” 353.
2

Ibid., 172.

3

Ibid., 172. Emphasis added.
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parts are not directly under a person’s control. For example, in a newborn infant, these
biological systems function automatically as parts of the human animal. The actions
related to these functions are generally construed as involuntary, and include other things
such as growth, heartbeat and breathing. An infant needs food and water for survival,
just like any other animal, and so he has an appetite or desire for food. Many of these
biological desires and appetites, and the related actions, are generally categorized as
instincts or instinctive. A child instinctively reaches out to his mother to nurse or seeks
out other nutrition. He has an appetite or desire for food. If a certain activity results in
satisfying an appetite or desire, just like any other animal, the human child will most
likely repeat the action. These instinctive actions can become habituated in the human
animal. A child’s instinct to eat, if satisfied in a particular way on a regular basis, would
cause a behavioral change which then becomes a disposition to act in a certain manner. I
do not intend (nor is it necessary to) impute any modern behavioral psychology to
Aristotle. This story fits with basic observation and categorization, an approach Aristotle
took to ethics. Aristotle’s discussions of pleasure and pain in Book II of the NE indicate
his concern with this aspect of human development. He points out that some pleasure
“grows up with all of us from infancy on” and it is difficult to change the associated
feelings which can become “dyed into our lives” (1105a2-5). The moral virtues are
concerned with these aspects of a human.
Aristotle describes a moral virtue as a particular state within a human being which
is “concerned with actions and feelings” (1104b14-15). The virtue is not a feeling or a
capacity to feel, but something which “causes its possessors to be in a good state and to
perform their functions well” (1106a16-17). The virtuous state is a disposition an
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individual has which causes her to act and feel a particular way in certain situations.
There are a variety of different situations an individual can encounter which require
action and which involve a range of emotions. Therefore, in order to better understand
the human dispositions related to morality, Aristotle groups human feelings and actions
into different categories. He starts from what might be construed as the more basic
human attributes related to emotions and the human animal nature and works his way to
the more complex dispositions related to thought.1 Some moral virtues, such as
temperance, are more concerned with the desiderative and appetitive part of the person.
As the name suggest, these parts of an individual are concerned with the desire for things
like food and drink or the appetite for sexual or other pleasures. Other moral virtues are
more directly connected to emotions, such as courage, as it relates to fear. Aristotle
argues that the moral virtues, which deal with desires and emotions, are primarily
acquired through habit.
Aristotle also observed another part of the soul which to him seems “to be
nonrational, though in a way it shares in reason” (1102b14-15). This other part of the
soul can be observed in human animal systems. For example, the sensory part of the
nervous system can cause a person to take an involuntary action, such as pulling his hand
away from intense heat in order to prevent bodily damage. However, an individual can
also endure intense, damaging heat by choosing to keep his hand on a hot surface. This
leads Aristotle to postulate that there is a second portion of the non-rational part of the
soul. Aristotle observes that there seems to be some part of the appetitive and

1

This is based upon the sequence within the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle starts with the moral
virtues in Book II which are related to a more basic animal nature and then proceeds to discuss the virtues
of thought, in Book VI, which he attributes to higher human functions found in reason.
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desiderative parts of a person which, while generally related to his animal nature, “shares
in reason” and yet at the same time it appears to be apart or somehow separate from
reason as well, so that this part of the soul appears at times to be “clashing and struggling
with reason” (1102b14-20).
Aristotle postulates that there is a struggle within the soul because we can observe
how the body parts go astray when “incontinent people have impulses in contrary
directions” (1102b20-25). While we cannot observe the soul, he argues that “we should
suppose that the soul also has something apart from reason, countering and opposing
reason” (1102b20-25). Aristotle also observes that over time an individual can develop
some level of control over some of his bodily systems. This control occurs when the
countering part of a person’s animal nature “obeys reason” (1102b26-29). Control can
best be observed in a continent person. The struggle and the relation between reason and
the body can be explained in simple examples. How much a person eats and what he eats
will affect overall bodily weight. An individual who decides he wants to lose weight
though a diet will struggle with the body’s need for nourishment. A similar struggle
occurs in a person who has developed a strong desire for alcohol and has made the
conscious decision to not drink alcohol. There is a struggle between the addictive desire
in the physical operation of the body and the mind, which attempts to control this
addictive desire. Prudence is the disposition or part of a person which serves the function
of trying to implement the commands of the intellect (reason), and get the body to obey
those commands.
The appetitive and desiderative parts of a person’s bodily functions are related to
human animal nature and are considered natural or in some cases instinctive in their
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movement. However, there is something in these bodily function, a part of them which
“both listens to reason and obeys it” in a manner more like the way a child obeys his
father, rather than the way we conceive the certainty of math (1102b30-35). Two plus
two does not sometimes equal four, it always does. Yet, a child (particularly a teenager)
may or may not obey a parent. The child sometimes provides no more reasoning for not
doing something than saying he didn’t feel like doing it. Aristotle seems to be describing
a way in which a person appears to choose not to listen to reason. It does not appear to
be purely a desire or appetite which overcomes reason. It sometimes is difficult to
separate this part which disobeys reason from the case where a person may not be able to
control his desires and appetites. An individual may decide it is too difficult to continue
dieting. But there also may be a point when a person needs food and something inside of
him drives him to eat. Up to some point, short of starvation, an individual may be able to
control his desire to eat. However, if the animal instinct becomes strong enough, it may
overpower reason and at that point the individual would act purely from his animal nature
for survival. Similarly, an individual may choose to drink or it may be the case that the
addictive craving for alcohol overcomes reason.
This notion of control and loss of control is central to Aristotle’s definition of a
moral virtue and Aristotle does not construe it as a simple matter. It is a complex subject
which he addresses at length both in general and related to specific virtues. What makes
it even more difficult to explain and justify is Aristotle’s target. A moral virtue is not a
simple disposition an individual has for controlling his animal appetites and desires, and
directing the related actions. A moral virtue is an excellence, a disposition in which an
individual has the highest level of control possible for a human being. He excels in the
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particular area under consideration. A virtuous act of courage is the most ethical action
an individual could have taken given the circumstances of the situation he encounters.
Understanding Aristotle’s concept of excellence requires further elaboration because the
description of a moral virtue that I have given thus far is somewhat behavioral and might
even be observable in other animals.
A dog can be trained to sit and stay put when presented with food, until it is
released by command. Different animals can be trained to excel in certain behaviors. In
like manner, the ability of a person to control his appetite is something which can be
learned and then observed in external behavior. What is different about Aristotle’s moral
virtue is what is taking place within the person. In the case of a dog’s behavior the
internal struggle to repress its instinct to eat the food presented can sometimes be
observed. The dog may intensely stare at the food or manifest a tension in her body,
ready to pounce on the morsel upon the release command. However there is no way of
determining exactly what is taking place inside the animal. Similar observations can be
made in humans. A person dieting may gaze at another person’s meal with what might
be construed as a look of hunger. While the definition of a moral virtue starts in this
simple behavioral fashion, it very quickly becomes complex. The reason the individual
has for taking a particular action and the feeling associated with the action are important
to determining whether or not a person has a particular virtue.
The intention and state of the individual taking a particular action are what
qualifies it as a virtuous action. As I have delineated it, this is what in I mean by going
the direction of going from the virtue to the action. Furthermore, the state and intention
are related to specific goals, going from the virtue in the direction of the principles. For
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purposes of understanding Aristotle’s requirements of a virtue, I will break the analysis
into three parts. The first part relates to the characteristics of a virtuous action. The
second part has to do with the state and character of the individual. The third has to do
with Aristotle’s overarching goal in the Nicomachean Ethics and how he connects his
goal to the virtuous action. All three of these are integral, interrelated parts of Aristotle’s
definition of a virtue with no one part standing separate. To be considered a virtuous
action, the action must be taken from a particular state, as a part of an individual’s overall
character and be directed to the proper goals within Aristotle’s theory.
Aristotle’s first two requirements, the characteristics of an action and the state of
the individual, are very tightly related and so I will discuss them together. A virtuous
action is an excellence, the most ethical action an individual can take in a given situation.
This excellence comes from the individual’s disposition which is his character trait. It is
a characteristic way an individual has of doing the right thing, which is habituated into
the individual through his efforts over time. The individual “must know [that he is doing
virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves;
and, third, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state” (1105a30-35). The
person needs to be able to figure out what must be done (or not done) and do it in the
proper manner. A virtuous action is one that “should accord with the correct reason”
(1103b32-34). The individual takes the prudent action. It is at this point that the
intellectual virtues come into the account of virtue.
The intellectual dispositions are things like understanding and wisdom. However,
there is one intellectual virtue which plays a critical role in Aristotle’s account of the
moral virtues. The intellectual dispositions concern the reasoning part of the individual
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and are mainly acquired through teaching (1103a15-19). Prudence is the one virtue
which does not fit neatly into Aristotle’s system. Prudence (phronesis) is defined as a
“state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human
goods” (1140b20-22). While Aristotle categorizes prudence as part of the intellect, he
also believes that it has a connection with the animal side of the soul, and thus is also
concerned with feelings and action. In this role, prudence serves a key function in
Aristotle’s theory. It is the link between knowing what the proper ethical action is
through the intellect (reason) and directing the body to carry out that action. The virtuous
person must be wise enough to know what to do. Then he must be prudent enough to
execute the action and do it properly.
Prudence plays a pivotal role in Aristotle’s theory. He argues that “we cannot be
fully good without prudence, or prudent without virtue of character” (1144b30). This ties
the virtues together in his sense that they all share in prudence, which connects and
unifies the virtues. If a person has courage, they make prudent decisions related to fear.
The same is true for other virtues, such as temperance or truthfulness. Aristotle argues
that virtue is “not merely the state in accord with correct reason, but the state involving
the correct reason” which is virtue (1144b26-30). A person can “have all the virtues if
and only if one has prudence” (1145a1-3). Prudence connects reason, which is part of the
intellect, with the action of the body, in that prudence “makes us achieve the things that
promote the end” (1145a5-7). The end is happiness and having the virtues entitles a
person “to be called good without qualification” (1145a1-3). It is important to note that
Aristotle as usually read as using this separation of the parts of the individual only for
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purposes of elucidation of functioning of ethical behavior. His general view of a human,
in modern terms, might best be described as holistically.
Aristotle’s focus on prudence and the importance it plays in his theory reflects the
emphasis he places on action. In my interpretation of Aristotle, I see a virtue ethics
theory which considers action as one of the most important components. Aristotle states
at the conclusion of the NE that “the aim of studies about action, as we say, is surely not
to study and know about a given thing, but rather to act on our knowledge” (1179b1-4).
This is to some degree counter to the opening comment about virtue ethics, which I
provided from Statman that virtue ethics is primarily about character. Many modern
virtue ethics theories reject the notion that the most important question in morality is
about what it is right to do or what is the right action to take.1 While the concept of a
virtue is central to virtue ethics theory, its purpose is to provide the vehicle or method for
a human to consistently and regularly take ethical actions. Aristotle built his theory from
the question ‘How can we get people to take ethical action?’ His answer was the concept
of a virtue. The critical element is the repeated efforts to make the right, ethical decision
and take ethical actions in order to develop the virtues. To understand the role for
prudence more fully first requires a further analysis of Aristotle’s conception of the
human and a critical element of Aristotle’s account, the notion of the mean.
While reason is the key element of Aristotle’s account, to be considered a virtuous
action the emotional condition of the individual must also be right. A person must have
1

Gregory Trianosky provided a survey and analysis of the variety of modern virtue ethics theories.
He outlined nine of the most common components of modern virtue ethics theories. However, he points
out that “nearly all contemporary writers on the virtues” reject the notion that the most important question
in morality is ‘what is it right or obligatory to do?’ Trianosky, “What Is Virtue Ethics All about?”, 335.
He goes on to explain that contemporary theories almost always contain arguments indicating that the
emphasis should be on aspects of the virtues or the related virtuous life.
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the proper feelings, in a particular situation, so that he will have “these feelings at the
right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the
right way” (1106b21-24). The individual’s reason and emotion must be a part of a
particular state of his character, from which he acts on a regular basis. To be a virtuous
person each of his moral actions reflects this state. That is a lot to ask of an action. What
is particularly challenging is how to address the emotional state of the individual.
As an example of the requirements for virtue, consider a dangerous situation
involving fear of death. A person with the virtue of courage will take the best possible
action he can take, will feel the proper amount of fear, and will take action for the right
reasons. In order to define a virtuous act, Aristotle must not only address the reasoning
part of the soul, but he must also figure out how to define the proper emotional response.
To describe the proper emotional state he develops the idea of a continuum. He considers
an emotion as something which is “continuous and divisible” in which “we can take
more, less, and equal” where the “equal is some intermediate between excess and
deficiency” (1106a25-34). He then relates this continuum to the emotional response a
person has in a situation. He bases his analysis of emotion on observation. In the case of
fear, on one end of the scale there are various levels of feeling fear too much. On the
other end of the scale there are levels of feeling fear too little. The continuum runs from
some level of extreme fear to feeling no fear at all. The excellent action is a courageous
action somewhere in-between the extremes, in a mean relative to an individual, in a
particular situation. An action toward one side of the mean, too much fear, represents the
vice of cowardice. Toward the other end of the scale, not enough fear, is the vice of

25

foolhardiness. The courageous action is just like “well-made products that nothing could
be added or subtracted” (1106b10-15).
A person working with the mean in view and exercising the excellent disposition
of courage, the virtue of courage, creates an action which “like nature, is better and more
exact than any craft” (1106b10-15). The person performing a virtuous action takes the
best action possible for him in the situation. Aristotle also argues that the mean can apply
either to “feelings or action” (1106b25). The mean is specific to an individual or as he
states it, the mean “is not the same for all” (1106a33). The action and emotion are
“intermediate relative to us” (1106b5-9). The idea of the mean is an important
component in the implementation of a virtue by an individual in a specific situation. It is
essential to Aristotle’s concept of virtue. The essence and definition of a virtue is “a
mean, but, as far as the best [condition] and the good [result] are concerned, it is an
extremity” (1107a6-9). A person has the ability to perform a virtuous act because over
time he has acquired an excellence in dealing with one of the areas of human life
involving an emotion such as fear. Over time, through repeated efforts and work, as well
as education, feedback from experience and maturity, a person learns to take the right
action in a given situation. A virtuous action is an excellent action and all the parts
involved within the individual are in harmony. His emotions and his reason are in accord
with what should be done and he executes the action. He no longer has a desire or
appetite to do something which reason would not agree is in the ethical action.
Both the account I have just given of the characteristics of a virtuous action and
the state of the individual, require a further understanding of the third part of my account
of Aristotle’s notion of a virtue. I started my account of Aristotle’s virtue ethics with a
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brief introduction of the goal of his theory. The moral decisions and actions of
individuals seem to be directed toward some good or end. Aristotle is trying to explain
the good for humans, how this good relates to the human end or telos and how this end
can be achieved through proper human decisions and actions. He concludes that the
“human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the
best and most complete virtue” (1098a15-20). Virtue is achieved over a lifetime and will
lead to eudaimonia, which is a form of happiness or human flourishing. It is a type of
happiness achieved in some sense throughout an individual’s lifetime, or “in a complete
life” in the sense that “one day or a short time” does not “make us blessed and happy”
(1098a15-20). A virtuous action is a good action, a virtue is a good character trait and a
virtuous life will lead to the good life. The end or telos which moral human beings aim at
is eudaimonia, a flourishing, good life. One of Aristotle’s primary goals in the NE is to
prescribe a way to achieve eudaimonia and have a good life.
Aristotle develops his notion of the good related to the moral virtues as something
proper to the function of a human being as a rational animal. This argument is made both
at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, primarily in Books I and II, and again at the
end, in a slightly different fashion, in Book X. Aristotle argues that the ends of many
decisions and actions are actually means to some other end, and the ultimate end is found
in happiness, which is the ultimate good or “best good” (1094a22). The end of happiness
is never chosen because of something else but “is complete without qualification”
(1097a35). Individuals may seek many other different ends, and it is not entirely clear
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that Aristotle necessarily connects them all to happiness.1 However, he clearly goes the
other direction and connects happiness to the good of the virtues and the good in the
virtues.2 A virtue is an action which accords with reason. Aristotle connects the good,
which is found in happiness, to the virtues, by connecting happiness to reason through his
function argument.3
Aristotle’s function argument starts with observation. He is trying to understand
what it is which separates humans from the other life forms and is unique only to
humans. Humans share things like nutrition and growth with the plants and sense
perceptions like sight and hearing with some animals. Reason is the unique characteristic
which is not shared with the other animals. In particular, the part of reason which is
purely intellectual thought is possessed only by humans. He concludes that “the human
function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (1098a1-9). His
next step is to try to express what it means for a human to excel at the particularly human
function of reason, as this relates to the human life. He conjectures that like the manner
in which the excellence of a musician in playing music will lead to the best song, the
excellence in the function of a human reason will lead to the life of happiness. Aristotle

1

There is some controversy over whether Aristotle defines the path to happiness in the first part of
the Nicomachean Ethics as it relates to the moral virtues, or as he construes it at the end, in contemplation
found in the intellectual virtues. I do not intend to address this issue herein because it is not relevant to my
overall thesis. However, I do not believe he construed happiness to only be found in a life of
contemplation. If this were the case, it would be a mistake born out of his elitist view of the world. Rather,
I think what he means is that an individual must have the time and capacity to contemplate in life in order
to be at least continent and have any chance at becoming virtuous. Someone who spends all his time and
energy surviving will have difficulty in ever bringing reason to bear on controlling his appetites and
desires. Only in and through contemplation can an individual find the road to happiness.
2

See comments by Terence Irwin in his footnotes to the Nicomachean Ethics, page 172, note 1 to

Book I.
3

The strong reading of this thesis is that Aristotle believes that a person can be happy if and only
if he is virtuous. I will address this concern later on in my thesis.
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argues that we take “the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to
be activity and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent
man is to do this well and finely” (1098a10-14). The excellent human being is not the
greatest athlete, musician, writer, scientist or someone who excels in a certain human
endeavor. The excellent human is someone who is virtuous. The end for humans can be
achieved through the proper use of human reason to control the animal and emotional
parts of the human soul. However, reason cannot accomplish this excellence on its own.
It needs the help of the moral virtues, which are the habituated dispositions which a
person develops to facilitate this effort. The connection between the end of happiness
and the disposition or acquired habit of a virtue can be understood in an example.
If an individual was in the military he might be required to stand at a post without
moving for a very long time. His ability to resist the instinctive desire to eat, drink or
scratch an itch would be important. In this instance if the soldier acts properly over a
long period of time, he might be promoted to a higher rank, which may be his goal. Thus
in this context he considers an action which goes against his natural desires as a good
thing. It helps him attain his end. If over time he exhibited the appropriate behavior, he
would be considered a good soldier within the military system to which he belonged.
This is the context which defines ‘good’ for this soldier. It might take time for him to
develop the disposition of standing still and it may come easier to some individuals. For
him to have developed the disposition to behave in the manner required of a soldier,
related to controlling instinctive desire, would be definitive of what might be considered
one of the ‘soldiering’ virtues or dispositions. This is the disposition or habit of resisting
the inclination to move while standing guard. When he attained the level where he no
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longer had the feeling that he wanted to move, where his reasoning was aligned with his
emotions, he would have the full virtue. If this particular action was important for all
soldiers, then as a soldier, his reasoning for acting in this fashion would matter.
However, if Aristotle’s notion of a virtue were imposed on this example, to be considered
virtuous the soldier would not act for personal advance in the ranks. If we could
conceive of him as a soldiering animal, or having the nature of being a soldier, he would
act because by doing so he would flourish as a soldier. When he had achieved all the
appropriate soldiering virtues would he flourish as a soldier. He would be an excellent
soldier based on the nature of a soldier, as defined by the military organization. This
analogy goes a little beyond Aristotle’s work in the NE and moves towards his Politics. I
want to be clear that I am not imputing this overarching view to him. Rather, I chose this
type of example because it is important for two reasons which will be valuable in
extending Aristotle’s theory to a care-based virtue theory.
First, this example highlights an important aspect of virtue ethics. A soldier
virtue may have special features which may help the soldier survive. The soldiering
virtues have significance to the individual soldier and the military unit to which he
belongs which connect to the functioning of the unit. Soldiers who can stand at a
location for a long time without movement give the unit a very structured appearance.
Marching in unison and other actions associated with military precision give the
perception of excellence. The difference between a unit of new recruits and a well
trained unit marching in formation would highlight this analogy. How both the
individual soldier and the military unit would excel with soldiering virtues parallels how
an individual and a society might excel with human virtues. However, a soldiering
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disposition may also help the soldier, or the unit, in a dangerous situation. He could find
himself in a situation where any motion would cause him to be discovered and killed.
His training could help him stay alive. The teamwork found in marching in unison
likewise helps the function and survival of the unit. While the primary reason for taking
the virtuous action is because the soldier will then be an excellent soldier, it also would
entail the survival of the soldier. Other soldiering virtues would be important for the
functioning and survival of the entire military unit. The idea of survival underlies
flourishing. I will return to this discussion and relate it to ideas within of care-based
virtue ethics theory as part of the foundational principles.
The second reason I chose the example of soldiering virtue is that it helps
understand the top down conceptualizing of a virtue ethics theory. The military unit can
be thought of as having an overarching goal. This goal is what determines the actions
required of the soldier. The disposition to carry out these actions the best way possible
are what defines or constitutes the virtue. The military example would represent a top
down approach to virtue ethics. The military unit has a goal and this goal defines the
soldiering virtue which then defines the right actions. I will not argue the point as to
whether or not Aristotle conceives his theory as a top down approach. Rather, I want to
use this example in contrast to how care-based virtue ethics is built, as a bottom up
approach.

31

Borrowing from Aristotle
As an overall work, the NE appears to be an attempt to make sense of the world
and then use that knowledge to help a person take actions. One of my goals is to develop
this care-based virtue ethics theory as something an individual can put to use in his or her
day to day decision making. In order to address this aspect, I must first give an account
of how a virtue ethics theory can address action. I will start by building on the account
Hursthouse gives of action.
In the notion of action I take from Aristotle, I mean intentional human action and
the choice involved. As mentioned earlier, in Aristotle’s account choice (prohairesis)
can be from belief, desire or both belief and desire. Hursthouse gives a very good
account of how virtue ethics addresses action.1 She argues that virtue ethics theory can
provide action guidance as well as either utilitarian or deontological theories. The way to
understand this account is through the practical syllogism. The practical syllogism is a
decision making tool which is relatively simple and, in its shortest version, requires three
components. It starts with a universal premise, which is followed by a specific premise
involving the evaluation of a situation. It concludes with action guidance. This simple
syllogism is of the form:
An action is right if and only if (iff) it is X.
Action A is X (and actions B, C, D, etc. are not X).
Therefore, I should take action A (the right action to take is A)
Additional premises can be added to further define the universal premise. Other premises
can also be inserted to qualify or elaborate on the situation and the action involved.
1

The following is based on Hursthouse’s discussion in On Virtue Ethics, pgs. 25-32, with some
modifications. Along with the focus on character, she points out that virtue ethics is usually improperly
construed as agent-centered rather than act-centered, concerned with Being rather than Doing and in
general that it is not focused on rules to provide action guidance, but more on arêtic concepts. 26.
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Hursthouse uses simplified versions of utilitarian and deontological theories for
comparative purposes and to clarify how the practical syllogism works in each theory.
Utilitarian theories start with the universal premise that an action is right iff it
promotes some form of best consequences. Deontological theories start with the
universal premise that an action is right iff it adheres to the correct moral rule. Virtue
ethics theories can be approached in two ways. The starting premise in a virtue ethics
theory could be either a virtuous principle or it could be a virtue. In the first case, an
action is right iff it corresponds to the virtuous principle. The second case is more
complex because a virtue is a character trait or disposition in an individual. Therefore,
the second case would be stated that an action is right iff it corresponds with what a
person with the specific virtue would do, or more simplistically the action is what a
virtuous person would do. This is considered the same as saying that the action
corresponds to a virtue. I want to first elaborate on Hursthouse’s discussion of how a
virtuous principle would function in the practical syllogism. I will then address the more
complex workings of how a virtue functions or how action can be derived from the
instruction to doing what the virtuous person would do.
Hursthouse points out that a virtuous principle or rule might be ‘do what is
honest’. She refers to these virtue ethics principles as v-rules and compares them to the
rules of deontological theories. A v-rule could also be a prohibition, such as ‘do not do
something which is uncharitable’.1 While she acknowledges that the broad nature of
these principles opens them to being evaluative or value-laden, she argues that the same
can be said for the initial principles of both utilitarian and deontological theories. Unless

1

See Hursthouse discussion, On Virtue Ethics, 37.
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a utilitarian theory uses content free definitions for happiness (and she claims that a few
try to), or does not try to rank higher and lower pleasures, it will also will need evaluative
conditions. The deontological theories run into the same problems with rules such as ‘do
no evil’ or ‘help others’, both of which contain evaluative terms. She points out that both
deontological and utilitarian theories provide guidance for action in the same manner
which virtue ethics theories would provide action guidance. The first premise of the
argument for justification of an action would be similar in structure for all three
approaches. An action is right (ethical) iff it promotes the best consequences, or is in
accordance with the correct moral rule, or it is in accord with a v-rule. Each of the three
theories must then turn to the next premise in order to determine what information
satisfies the first premise. A utilitarian must determine what the best consequences are.
deontologist must ascertain the proper rule . Someone adhering to a virtue ethics theory
must determine the proper v-rule. Hursthouse argues that when appealing to v-rules,
virtue ethics theories have a very clear action component. The difficulty involved in
understanding the connection between action and a virtue generally arises when the
principles of a virtue ethics theory are based on the character of the individual. There
tends to be confusion in trying to understand the relation between action and ‘what the
virtuous agent would do’.
A virtue ethics theory will sometimes use as the first premise the notion that an
action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the situation.
Hursthouse states that this approach only adds additional subsequent premises. There
needs to be additional qualifications on the universal premise or additional premises
leading up to the action instructions. In the virtue ethics syllogism the additional premise
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could be as simple as stating that the virtuous agent would do the v-rule. It could be as
complex as discussing the character traits of the virtuous agent. It is no different than
what may be necessary to qualify the meaning of the most happiness in a utilitarian
theory, or explaining the meaning of a rule in a deontological theory. In fact, Hursthouse
makes a very important point. The account of action in virtue ethics theory actually
reflects the real world as well, if not better than, either deontological or utilitarian
theories. It is an issue which leads to an important perspective of virtue ethics theory. In
moral decision making, individuals may consider rules and also take into account the
consequences of their moral actions. However, they also frequently ask others for advice
about those rules or consequences and they also look to how other individuals act in
similar circumstances.
What is of significance in Hursthouse’s commentary is how she addresses the idea
that the right action for a person to take is to do what the virtuous agent would do. One
of the more common objections to virtue ethics theories is that this method of
determining ethical action is not valid. She turns this objection into a strength of virtue
ethics theory. To determine what he should do, an individual should ask a virtuous
person what to do. Or he could ask a virtuous person what she would do in the particular
situation. Asking for help and advice is a method which people regularly employ. In
building her case, Hursthouse starts with what she finds as one of the strengths of
Aristotle’s work as it relates to the everyday world of human ethics. She states that to
“read almost any other famous moral philosopher is to receive the impression that we, the
intelligent adult readers addressed, sprang fully formed from our father’s brow.”1 In our
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day-to-day lives seeking and giving moral guidance is a very common method of
determining how to proceed in a situation. It is particularly important and prevalent in
raising children. Most people experienced it themselves in their upbringing. Moral
guidance comes from a variety of sources such as parents, family members, educational
institutions, sports groups, religion and other parts of society. As adults we also seek
moral advice and guidance from people whom we believe to be morally better than
ourselves. In considering how individuals take moral action, she points out that “we do
not always act as ‘autonomous’, utterly self-determined agents.”1 She goes on to point
out that this can also apply to the negative side of human moral action. When a person
wants to do something wrong, he may also ask those he believes to be morally inferior, in
order to facilitate rationalizing an unethical action he may want to take. She argues that
this aspect of virtue ethics is an advantage that it has as a theory over deontology or
utilitarianism. It more closely reflects the way individuals function in real life and it
contains an element which addresses moral development.
The obvious response to this argument, from opponents of virtue ethics, is that
finding a virtuous person may be very difficult, if not impossible. Even Aristotle claims
that to become a fully virtuous person is a very rare accomplishment.2 To this
Hursthouse responds that it is “simply false that, in general, ‘if I am less than fully
virtuous, then I shall have no idea what a virtuous agent would do’ as the objection
claims.”3 Many good pieces of advice are qualified within the context of ‘do as I say, not
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as I do’. Because someone is not fully virtuous does not mean that they do not know the
right thing to do. If a person has achieved some level of virtue (continence) or some
minimal list of virtues, such as honesty and temperance, she can give reasonable advice.
Someone morally better than an individual could provide advice to him. It is not
necessary that the individual has achieved the highest level of virtue possible, such as that
conceived by Aristotle. It is also not necessary to actually find and consult a virtuous
person in every situation. It is not too difficult to conclude that the virtuous agent would
do the honest or temperate thing, or would be characteristically honest. In furtherance of
this argument she turns toward some parallels with deontological and utilitarian theories.
Hursthouse both provides some insight into the hierarchy which can be found in
morality and relates this to moral development. Rarely do we teach our children just
plain and simple rules. We generally start by giving explanations regarding the
consequences of a rule. We may teach a child not to lie because the child may be
punished, or not to steal because he might end up making the person he took something
from sad. Throughout the moral education of a child we try to give some merit to the
rule, some explanation or justification. As the education process progresses, teaching a
child not to lie or steal develops into teaching him about honesty. For example, there are
many rules related to food consumption, sexual relations or financial responsibility which
are related to temperance. The rules taught as part of temperance can be explained with a
variety of reasons. A child may be instructed to share food so that he makes more people
than just himself happy or so that others less fortunate will have food. One of the
strengths of virtue theory is found in teaching about the value of truth in general, rather
than simply instructing a child to refrain from lying because of the consequences or
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because it is a rule. This type of moral education occurs from an early age. A young
child may be told to be kind to his younger sibling because he is smaller and needs the
protection of his older sibling. This benefit continues as the child grows older and he is
told not to lie because of the importance of friendships or relationships, or what it means
to his reputation. It is important to not simply teach a rule. This broader moral education
is a part of how society functions. Providing children evaluative conditions helps them to
not just learn rules to repeat without thought. Individuals learn rules through the
understanding of principles, which is a method employed in many other areas of
education.1
The developmental aspect of virtue that Hursthouse has outlined contains another
important component which would be a direction worth exploring in the construction of
the full care-based virtue ethics theory. I will only briefly touch on it here in reference to
ideas Aristotle has regarding the next step he intended in the enlargement of his ethical
theory. In an analysis of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, Peter Simpson summarizes what
Aristotle says are the “three things through which we become good: nature, habit and
teaching.”2 Aristotle argues that there is nothing a person can do about his nature, and
that teaching only works if the individual’s character is already disposed or has been
properly prepared. This preparation is a very important aspect of developing a good
character and the related consistent ethical action. Preparation of character requires
“proper training from youth up, and that, in turn, cannot be achieved without the right
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laws.”1 This argument is made at the end of the NE in Book X as Aristotle’s lead into the
Politics. It highlights the importance Aristotle placed on the indoctrination of habits into
an individual from a very young age. In some regards the Politics can be seen as
Aristotle’s attempt to outline a way in which society could be structured to accomplish
Aristotle’s the preparation of character in an individual.2 By many accounts, the Politics
appears as a method of structuring the formal legal and governmental parts of society.
However, Simon sees in Aristotle some of the more personal aspects of his approach. As
Simon puts it, in order to learn ethical teaching a person’s “character must first be
disposed to virtue and already be in love with the beautiful.”3 As Aristotle outlines it,
habituation and teaching in the upbringing of young people are critical components of
virtue ethics. In a sense, virtue ethics theory is about how an adult individual ought to
develop virtues, but it starts with addressing how a person develops his character traits as
a child. The early moral development of a child is an important component of Aristotle’s
virtue ethics theory. He emphasizes at the beginning of the NE that individuals “need to
have had the appropriate upbringing – right from early youth” (1104b10-12). He
concludes the NE with a similar sentiment, that the “student needs to have been prepared
by habits” (1179b25). There is a societal role to be played in the moral development of a
child. This is a component of the ethics of care which I will only touch on in this thesis.
There are many rich areas in the literature regarding the ethics of care which address the
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moral development and care. Noddings devotes the final chapter of her book to the
subject. He states that the “primary aim of every educational institution and every
educational effort must be the maintenance and enhancement of caring.”1 She includes a
very broad listing of those involved in this education, from parents and teachers to
coaches and preachers.
Applying Aristotle’s approach to virtue, a virtue might be thought of as starting
with the development of humans. As individuals develop, the virtues are drawn out of
the nature of the actions coming from the desires, appetites and feelings of the human
animal, which are directed by reason. The directions of reason first come from others,
such as parents, teachers and friends. The social component is important from the very
beginning, so that it “is best, then, if the community attends to upbringing, and attends
correctly” (1180a30-33). Other people help shape the early actions of a child toward a
particular disposition. Dispositions which grow into virtues are ones which appeared to
lead to flourishing. Courage and honesty are virtues because they are thought to be good.
This comes from observing people individually and within society. Thus Aristotle opens
and closes the NE with a discussion of the aim of his work, toward the developing an
ethical society through political science. Action is the end of political science and “for
those who accord with reason in forming their desires and in their actions, knowledge of
political science will be of great benefit” (1095a5-11).
My intent is not to read too much into Aristotle’s work, but rather to extract from
it and put it to good use. In Aristotle’s account, a virtuous action must come from a
virtuous state which is aimed at human happiness. The virtues represent a kind of
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harmony within an individual. Aristotle is both describing and prescribing. He starts
with observations of the nature of the human animal, as creatures of habit that seem to
have conflicts within themselves, between their animal and rational parts. This is
observable in a person’s actions and his related emotions. Aristotle prescribes a formula
for what he believes individuals seek in life. My being virtuous and teaching children
virtue an individual can find “happiness or satisfaction in the attainment of one’s natural
human end of perfection.”1

Modern Challenges to Virtue Ethics Theory from Aristotle’s Work
As I have indicated, I plan to draw on Aristotle’s work for some of the structure
of care-based virtue ethics theory. Before I move on from Aristotle to Aquinas, I need to
address two interrelated challenges which are unique to virtue ethics theories. These
problems relate to Aristotle and will help introduce Aquinas’s religious account of virtue.
The first problem is the close tie between virtue ethics theory and Aristotle’s work. The
second problem is the connection between Aristotle and religion.
Since deontological and utilitarian theories are relatively new, they have
reasonably clear recent foundations from which most modern theories have been built.
On the other hand, virtue ethics theory carries with it the legacy of Aristotle’s work. His
work is generally considered the foundation of modern virtue ethics theories.2 Some
modern authors, such as Alasdair MacIntyre, have argued that there is great merit in a
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return to Aristotle’s theory. MacIntyre concludes that the modern state of morality in the
world represents the failure “of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of one of
sociology” to develop a valid moral theory centered on the “liberal individualistic point
of view” espoused by these projects.1 He argues that “the Aristotelian tradition can be
restated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social
attitudes and commitments.”2 So much has been written about the NE and Aristotle’s
other related or unrelated works, that it is difficult to simply extract something from his
theory and use it, or to reference something like the NE as a complete theory. Aristotle’s
theory was by no means complete but it is a great foundational document. This problem
can be stated as the difficulty in developing a modern virtue ethics theory based on
Aristotle’s work, without being construed as bringing all, or most of his other
components along. Resolution of this first problem is highlighted in the project of
Hursthouse. She pulls the valuable components out of Aristotle’s work and leaves the
problematic parts behind. I have the same intention.
The second problem, somewhat unique to virtue ethics, is also pointed out by
MacIntyre. This is the connection between Aristotle’s virtue ethics theory and western
religious traditions. MacIntyre states that “no doctrine vindicated itself in so wide a
variety of contexts as did Aristotelianism: Greek, Islamic, Jewish and Christian; that
when modernity made its assaults on an old order world its most perceptive exponents
understood that it was Aristotelianism that had to be overthrown.”3 He does not elaborate
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in any detailed manner on this comment (other than to espouse the fact that
“Aristotelianism is philosophically the most powerful of pre-modern modes of moral
thought”1) but he implies that the connection was very tight between Aristotle’s notions
and many of the doctrines of western religions. The assault which MacIntyre is referring
to comes from both the scientific revolution’s effect on religious beliefs, and the effects
of the separation of church and state espoused in the modern democratic state,
particularly in the United States. My project is designed to address this second problem.
Obviously a large part of the close connection between Aristotelian virtue ethics and
religion (particularly Christian religion) was forged by Aquinas. I plan to extract some of
the value out of what Aquinas constructed based on Aristotle’s work and his virtue ethics,
and leave behind the problematic areas related to Christianity.
I have repeatedly tried to qualify my use of Aristotle’s work and I will apply the
same qualification for my use of Aquinas’s work, as I enter a discussion of his virtue of
charity. My intent to draw on a narrow component of his complex system and utilize it
within the care-based virtue ethics theory I plan to outline. However, MacIntyre’s
commentary offers some insight into what I find exciting about making the connection
between Aristotle’s work on virtue, charity, and the use of care in the functional role of
charity. What I understand MacIntyre to be saying is that when modern society threw out
religion, it threw out Aristotle. In extracting religion from the education system it seems
that much of the morality of Aristotle came out with it. My project is to reinstate
Aristotle and the excellent contributions Aquinas made to his work, through the virtue of
care.
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Aquinas and Aristotle
Moving from Aristotle to Aquinas requires some introductory comments.
Philippa Foot expresses the close nature of the relationship between the two, in that “by
and large Aquinas followed Aristotle–sometimes even heroically–where Aristotle gave
an opinion, and where St. Thomas is on his own, as in developing the doctrine of
theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, and in his theocentric doctrine of happiness,
he still uses an Aristotelian framework where he can: as for instance in speaking of
happiness as man's last end.”1 However, she goes on to discuss the fact that Aquinas had
different emphasis in some areas. While there are many similarities between them, an
important difference is pointed out by Martin Stone in his analysis of both of their
theories. Most notably Stone points out that Aquinas’s ethics is always secondary to his
theology.2 For example, while his natural law theory has similarities to the naturalism in
Aristotle, Aquinas starts with the premise that natural law proceeds from God’s reason
and fits with man because it was instilled into him.3 While the relationship between
Aristotle and Aquinas is close, Stone warns us that we need to be careful not to get too
carried away the similarities.
Stone thinks another important difference between their theories comes out of
Aquinas’s focus on theology. Stone does not believe that Aquinas should be included
among “the pantheon of so-called virtue ethicists…at least as this term is presently
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understood.”1 Stone does not consider Aquinas’s theory as virtue ethics to some degree
because of the historical setting, but more particularly the difference arises from the
theological context of Aquinas’s work. Aquinas has a strong sense of duty to God
underlying his theory and thus his theory could be considered more of a deontological
theory. My thesis is that without the theological aspects, Aquinas has an exceptional
virtue ethics theory. Further, as already noted by Foot, Aquinas worked things out in
much more detail than Aristotle.2 I believe there is great value to be found in this detail.
However, the theological aspects of Aquinas’s work are found throughout his theory and
it will take a significant effort to review all of his work without them. That is why I have
keep a narrow focus within Aquinas’s work. My goal is to lay the foundation for a later
full reworking of Aquinas’s theory, using care in place of charity. I will carry forward
much if what I have taken from Aristotle, but in this thesis I will limit in what I borrow
from Aquinas.
I will focus my work on charity to the section Aquinas dedicates to it in the
Disputed Questions on the Virtues, although I will review some limited commentary from
the Summa. I will maintain this narrow focus to try to control the scope of my thesis. In
addition, what I plan to discuss is the role of charity found in that section and the
similarities between it and charity. My focus will be on taking the foundational aspects
of charity and demonstrating how care can fill this role. From this foundation there will
be many opportunities for developing the structure of a virtue ethics theory similar to

1

Stone, “The Angelic Doctor and the Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Aristotelian
Ethics,” 125.
2

Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, 2.

45

Aquinas, without the theological problems. I will point the direction to some of these
opportunities in sections of the body of this thesis and in my concluding comments.
Along with his account of virtue, the most important part of Aristotle’s virtue
ethics theory is found in reason, and in particular prudence. As Stone points out,
Aquinas’s account of moral reasoning is consistent with Aristotle’s view.1 However,
Aristotle’s account of reason has problems which Aquinas seeks to address. If we
consider the problems with reason in modern terms, they are similar to problems found in
deontological or utilitarian theories. This problem can be seen in taking a form of logical
reasoning and trying to apply it to an ethical situation. There is the appearance that there
is an algorithm, form of calculation or logical argument which could be used that would
lead to the correct action to take in a situation. If all the parameters and facts about the
situation can be entered into the formula, an answer will be produced. While prudence
incorporates aspects of the logic of reason, there is something in the practical side which
cannot be addressed in a formula. It could be that there are too many inputs for any
human to manage, or it may be that the issue of the indeterminacy of the future that
makes resolution of a problem impossible. It could be in the problems related to
understanding choice and free will. Most likely it is a combination of all of these issues.
While Aquinas would not have viewed the problems in this fashion, he might have seen
similar issues. Reason needs to be grounded in a first principle.
Aristotle’s function argument is built around reason and he tried to ground this
theory in eudaimonia. Along with other possible problems with Aristotle’s account,
Aquinas addresses two specific issues. First, Aristotle’s function argument does not
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address question about the designer of the function of humans, just like the designer of a
tool determines its function and thus excellence. Secondly, reason allows one to start
with different first principles to attain this end. Aristotle devoted a whole section of the
NE to discussing some of the misconceptions about what leads to happiness. However,
other than prudence, he never really provides an answer to what it is that ties all the
virtues together or grounds them all, other than the end of eudaimonia. As discussed
earlier in relation to utilitarian theories, what makes people happy is still something
which is not a settled issue. Aquinas solves both of these problems with God. God
designed humans and He is the end. The virtue of charity ties all the virtues together and
connects them to God. If Aquinas’s work can be utilized without the theological
underpinning it will provide a very strong structure for a virtue ethics theory. As Stone
points out, Aquinas “reveals a way of talking about the virtues and of their place within
the moral life that is rarely articulated within modern-day ethics” and he believes that this
might “help to provoke virtue ethicists to broaden their chronological horizons and
consider the vast materials of reflection about the virtues that can be found in medieval
and early modern philosophy.”1
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Chapter 4: Charity
There are several different meanings associated with the word charity. Although
Aristotle did not discuss charity he did have some virtues which might be considered
similar to charity, such as liberality, magnificence and friendship. However, none of
them capture the depth of Aquinas’s notion of charity. While Aristotle classified the
virtues into two broad groupings, the moral and the intellectual virtues, charity is a part of
a whole new category of virtues which Aquinas developed and called the theological
virtues. While I will mainly focus on Thomas Aquinas’s definition of charity as a virtue,
I will also refer to the other related aspects of his theory where necessary. In this section
I will provide an overview of charity. I will also discuss more of the details of charity in
the section later on regarding the similarities between care and charity and how care can
fill the role of charity.
In building on Aristotle’s work, Aquinas added virtues in the new category of
theological virtues. The theological virtues are faith, hope and charity.1 The primary
distinguishing characteristic of a theological virtue is the fact that it is infused by God
and not something an individual could acquire on his own. This new categorization
could be considered an extension of, or connected to, Aristotle’s work in two ways.
While this is a loose connection, I believe it is an important one. This connection
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contains an important thread not only in the transition from Aquinas to Aristotle, but also
to some of the notions of care that I will be addressing. The first way the theological
virtues are connected to Aristotle’s virtues of character stems from Aristotle’s discussion
that a human being has a proper function, based on the design of a human. Aristotle
leaves open the question of who was the designer of humans. Aquinas answers this
question directly, attributing the design of humans to God through the “rational soul,
which is brought into being directly by God.”1 God’s hand in human design is one of the
foundations of Aquinas’s theory. It is in the rational part of the soul that Aristotle finds
the excellence of the function of a human and in which Aquinas sees the hand of God.
The second connection between the theological virtues and the virtues of
character is in the similarity between one particular aspect of both types of virtues. The
theological virtues are infused into humans by God. Humans cannot do anything to
acquire a theological virtue like charity except “prepare ourselves to receive charity from
God.”2 However, while it is not possible to acquire charity on her own, Aquinas sees
human charity as something that an individual can improve on. Charity can become
more complete in a person through her actions “not by growing in quantity, but by
intensifying in quality.”3 Aquinas does not believe that a person can possess complete
charity in this earthly life because that can only happen in the presence of God, but he
does believe that in this life a person “can possess charity completely in relation to the
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stage of time.”1 Aquinas contrasts this to an acquired virtue which “is caused by its
subject and is not wholly dependent on something external as charity is.”2 In a similar
fashion, Aristotle states that “none of the virtues of character arises in us naturally” so
that they “arise in us neither by nature nor against nature. Rather, we are by nature able
to acquire them, and we are complete through habit” (1103a19-25). Aquinas’s
theological virtues come from outside the human, from God. Aristotle’s moral virtues
must be acquired also, so in a sense they come from outside the human. The sense that
Aristotle has is that it is the obligation of the community to prepare children for be ready
to develop the virtues. While there is not a direct correlation between Aquinas’s
sentiment of receiving an infused virtue, and then intensifying it, and Aristotle’s notion of
being equipped by nature and prepared by society to acquire a virtue, and then
developing it, there is a parallel.
The two connections between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s notions of virtue are that
there is need of something to ground reason (eudaimonia or God) and that humans must
somehow obtain certain virtues (from society or God). These two general concepts are
important to the notion of virtue ethics. I will try to address these foundational issues
from a third perspective in care-based virtue ethics theory. I will try to accomplish this
by building on the specific characteristics and roles Aquinas develops for charity as part
of his solution to these two issues.
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In the place which Aquinas puts it, charity “is not only a virtue, but the most
powerful of the virtues.”1 What is unique about how Aquinas construes charity is that it
is not only an important virtue, but it has a role to play in all the virtues. It unifies the
virtues and as such is “(i) the form of the virtues, (ii) their moving cause, and (iii) their
root.”2 The first part of this sentiment indicates that in some sense every virtue is a form,
type or variety of charity. The second part indicates that charity is the action component
of a virtue causing movement or motivation and, in keeping with Aristotelian aspects of
Aquinas, implies that charity has some relation to prudence. Finally as the root of virtue,
charity has a connection to first principles and other virtues grow from charity. I will
briefly review each of these aspects of charity.
Every virtue takes some part of its form from charity. Aquinas states that charity
is the love of God. However this love must be qualified. The infinite love of God can
only be received by humans “in a finite way.”3 Thus God infuses a love similar to His
love into humans. God’s love is a very powerful thing, beyond the ability of a human to
handle, so He provides a human version which is found in charity. While the love God
given humans is to be returned to God, Aquinas also construes charity to be something
humans need to use in their earthly life. This is because “charity has two objects: God
and neighbor.”4 God always maintains the primary role, so that “the neighbor is loved
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only for the sake of God.”1 However, loving a neighbor for the sake of God is a very
powerful sentiment for Aquinas. He takes these two sentiments, love of God and love of
neighbor, and uses them as a part of charity in its function underling the virtues, as their
form. Things like honesty, courage or temperance are forms of the love of God or
neighbor.
As the moving cause of the virtues, charity in turn moves the individual to action.
Charity is the disposition of the love of, and from God, that a person expresses in the
actions she takes in life. Individuals possess the “created disposition of charity which
can be the formal principle of an action of love.”2 Aquinas places God and neighbor out
in front of the virtues as the good, so that “all the actions of all the virtues are ordered
towards the highest good as something loved.”3 It is charity which is the “moving cause
of all the virtues, in that it commands the activities of all the other virtues.” 4
Finally, every virtue is rooted in the love of God and neighbor found in charity.
In Aristotle’s theory, it is the higher capacity of reason, as the human function, to which
the virtues are ordered.5 Aquinas’s builds the structure one level higher, so that God,
through charity, is the highest order capacity which moves the lower capacities and thus
the “lower are ordered towards the goal of the higher.”6 In order to connect charity to
Aristotle’s notion of a virtue and the resulting action a human takes, Aquinas relates
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charity to reason and prudence. He does this through the concept of the will. The will is
a complex topic in Aquinas. However, for my thesis I will take a narrow focus and
primarily address the will in relation to charity.
Aquinas adds to Aristotle’s discussion of the struggle between reason and the
lower animal parts of the soul. He builds on Aristotle’s discussion of this struggle
through the development of the concept of the will. Aquinas’s notion of the will is not
found in Aristotle, but is related to the appetitive and desiderative parts of a person’s soul
which participates in reason and “both listens to reason and obeys it” (1102b30).
Aquinas follows Aristotle’s lead in stating that the soul controls the physical movement
of the body in a despotic way. For example, unless externally constrained, if a person
commands her arm to move, it will move. However, Aquinas states that reason “controls
the lower parts of the soul with a royal or political rule, i.e. as kings or princes of cities
control free men, who have the right and ability to resist with respect to some of the
orders a king or prince might give.”1 The lower part of the soul has the ability to resist
reason. The virtues help reason to get the lower parts of the person to cooperate and are
“a kind of tendency or completeness in the sensory desire that will enable it to obey
reason easily.”2 Aquinas introduces the will into the struggle in this middle ground.
In Aquinas’s theory, the human faculties capable of possessing virtue are “(i’)
intelligence, (ii’) will, and (iii’) lower desire, which is divided into the sensual and the
aggressive parts.”3 Aquinas construes each of these three parts as having “(a) receptivity
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to virtue and (b) an active principle of virtue.” 1 The will is the key component within the
human soul. Charity is in the will, which is the only capacity which possesses it, so that
charity is considered “the virtue of the will.”2 Charity is also the form of the virtues or
“the principle of all the other virtues in this sense, in that it moves them all towards its
own end.”3 In this function then, charity is the force that moves the will. One of the
primary roles for the will is as actuator of the body. Reason determines what is good and
the will “aims at something that it understands as good” as presented to it by reason.4
The will then actuates the body, cajoling it into following what the will perceives as
good. Charity plays the primary role in this actuation. Charity, the love of God and
neighbor, moves the will, and the will moves the individual. Charity is the love of God.
Aquinas puts theology first and thus charity, the love of God, is the virtue which keeps
God as primary.
It is important to note that without charity, there would be circularity in Aquinas’s
theory. This is because the will is needed to get the intelligence in motion for the person
to do anything since “the will qua active moves the intelligence.”5 Reason presents
something to the will, which the will pursues. Yet the will actuates reason toward the
good which reason presents. Aquinas resolves this circularity through charity. It is
charity which moves the will and thus charity which moves the intelligence or reason.
Without charity, the intelligence can present the wrong thing to the will as good. The
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will which contains charity seeks God and both moves the intelligence to seek the proper
end and moves the individual to take the proper action. In moving the will, charity plays
the primary role in Aquinas’s theory, in a place ahead of reason. In the role charity plays
in Aquinas’s theory, it represents the first principle, as it relates to God, Who is the
ultimate first principle. Charity moves the will and in this sense it may be thought of as
prior to reason.
Stated as a thesis, Aquinas’s ethical theory is based on the principle that any
disposition rooted in charity, or which is a form of charity, is a virtue. Any action taken
based on this type of virtue is the right, ethical action. This is based on the connection to
God provided by charity. The desire to unite to God, which is the love of God, and the
related love of neighbor, is provided to virtues and thus action by charity. The desire to
unite with God is also the motivation found in charity which is the moving cause of the
action coming from a virtue.
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Chapter 5: Care-Based Virtue Ethics Theory
I develop care-based virtue ethics (CVE) theory in the form of a generic applied
ethics theory. In order to outline the structure I build around CVE, I need to limit the
parts I address. I start with a general statement of the problem to be solved. Next, a
central hypothesis or idea is developed, with an interrelated group of ideas. Some
assumptions or premises are introduced and a logical argument is presented. Peter
Simpson offers some helpful guidance for virtue ethics theory construction. Simpson
argues that a virtue ethics theory should give at least “a reasoned account of what virtue
in general is and why it is necessary to be virtuous, or why being virtuous is good.” 1 He
also believes that there should be some account of the kinds of the particular virtues, why
they are good and what acts emanate from those virtues. He believes that appealing to
Aristotle’s notion of human happiness, or appealing to flourishing alone, does not fulfill
these qualifications.
My formulation of CVE theory addresses these issues in outline form. I present a
thesis and argument that as a virtue, care is universal and can be justified as a primary
ethical principle. I draw on some of the commentary related to Aristotle’s and
Hursthouse’s arguments, to address the application of care and how it relates to the status
of acts. The central feature related to the nature of a virtue is drawn out of Aquinas’s
notions of charity.
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The Problem
I have already briefly discussed the problems with both Utilitarian and Kantian
ethics. In that discussion, I also drew on the work of Hursthouse in addressing some of
the challenges virtue ethics theories face. My aim in this section is to frame the problem
by discussing an overarching problem with ethics in general. The CVE theory outline
follows Aristotle, who opened and closed the NE stressing the point that the aim of his
enquiry was not just knowledge, but action. In the early part of the 20th century, P.S.
Burrell described ethics as a form of practical philosophy. It is intended to help a person
discover in general terms what he ought to do, why he should do it, and motivate him to
follow its principles. These instructions should be in a format such that a person can
apply the theory to his day to day life.1 An ethical theory must set down instructions
which a person can follow regarding what he ought to do in any particular moral situation
he may face. However, that is not always easy to accomplish. The difficulty of the
struggle in ethics is found in the constantly changing nature of the world and the nature of
the human animal. The problem remains the same today as it was in the time of
Aristotle, in that it “is the business of everybody to determine what is the best for him to
do or to be, but as the situation in which he finds himself is different for every individual
and is constantly changing from moment to moment, the particular problem with which
each has to deal – shall I do this? or shall I do that? – is always changing and always
new.”2 While ethical situations may have similarities, no two will ever be exactly the
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same. Not only does each situation vary, but every individual person is unique in a wide
variety of ways.
Aristotle recognized the difficulties presented by the fact that there is no clear cut
answer which can be imposed on a specific individual moral dilemma. His doctrine of
the mean is an effort to address this problem. A courageous action is something which
falls somewhere between the extremes of cowardice and rashness. In Socratic fashion,
Aristotle states that there is no definitive, objective or exact notion of courage which can
be applied universally to individuals in different specific situations, no matter how
similar the situations appear. The mean “is not one, and is not the same for all” but is
“intermediate relative to us” (1106a30-1106b10). This does not imply that there is no
courageous action, just that the person and circumstances determine the measure of
morality in the action. It is clear to Aristotle that “there is only one way to be correct”
(1106b32). However, this is not a universal way, but a specific way of being correct,
given all the circumstances surrounding the individual and the situation encountered. If it
were possible to account for all aspects of a situation, and the history of the individual
life, then the one way of being correct might be objectively definable. The structure of
virtue ethics theory which Aristotle outlines takes this into account. That is why he gives
prudence such an important role. Aristotle states that the mean, which is “defined by
reference to reason,” is to be determined as “the prudent person would define it”
(1107a1-4). There is a hierarchy in everyday ethical decision making. The moral
character of an individual is based on his dispositions. His dispositions (virtues) are
based on principles, and principles provide rules to individuals to guide action. The
circumstances determine the right action. An honest and courageous individual follows

58

the principles of honesty, courage and prudence. Since principles are flexible enough to
allow for the variety of situations, an individual can determine which rules to apply to a
situation and how to apply them. The problem with this simplistic scenario is found in
determining how to properly construct a virtue ethics theory, one that will have a solid
structural foundation from which to ground the principles, provide flexible, useful action
guidance, and avoid being relativistic. In addition, the theory should be built from the
bottom up, so that the action creates the virtuous disposition.

Hypothesis
The central thesis of the CVE theory is that a properly construed notion of care,
instilled and developed in an individual, can provide the foundational basis of moral
decision making. Properly developed, the virtue of care is the naturalistic form, moving
cause and root of all the other virtues. Any action taken based on a disposition which is a
form of care is ethical. Stated another way, a care based action is an ethical action. The
virtue of care is based on a clearly defined notion. It has a naturalistic, universal aspect.
As a part of instinctive human animal nature, care is in everyone. Care is a natural
characteristic of a human. A second, higher level of this natural care can be instilled in
an individual, starting at the very earliest moments of his or her life. This second level of
care, while based primarily on the maternal relationship, includes consideration of the
paternal aspects and anyone involved in the care and upbringing of a child. The natural
care, and care instilled early in life, can be drawn out of any individual and developed
into the highest level of care, which is relational care. This highest level of level of care
contains the instinctive and emotional content of both of the first two levels, and is where
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the element of reason begins to play a more significant role. It serves as the basis for
relations with others. As the root of other virtues, over a lifetime, the other virtues grow
out of care. Any action taken, based on a disposition which is rooted in care, will be
ethical. Care is the primary virtue and moves the individual to action through the will.
Care is the virtue of the will. In this capacity, it resides in the middle of the human soul,
connecting the desires/appetites and reason. Through care based ethical action,
developed into the virtues, individuals can create a moral society, and hopefully achieve
some level of harmony.
Parts of the CVE thesis obviously sounds a lot like the portions of Aristotle’s and
Aquinas’s theories which I have been discussing. My thesis is to propose that what I
have drawn out of Aristotle’s work would be carried into Aquinas’s theory. It would then
be possible to rework Aquinas’s theory using care. There are several important
differences between CVE and Aquinas’s theory, which I address in more detail when I
discuss the various components of CVE. However, there is one significant difference
with what I bring from Aristotle. One of Aristotle’s goals in the NE was to provide
instructions in how to become virtuous. A virtuous person would flourish, or have the
happiness of eudaimonia. However, Aristotelian virtuous agents are very rare
individuals. Not only must the virtuous agent have mastered all the virtues within
himself, but he must also have external goods including things like health and friendship.
Aquinas might be said to have a goal similar to Aristotle. However, the aim of Aquinas’s
theory is to direct the individual in how to become a saint, a person who is in some way
united with God. A saint is also a very rare individual. The goal of CVE theory is to
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provide a notion of virtue which is more attainable, while at the same time challenging an
individual to achieve a level of moral excellence.
The notion of a virtuous individual in CVE theory is someone who excels at being
an ethical human being. At each stage of life, an individual will both be able to attain a
level of virtue and yet still have room to improve. Development of the virtues is a
lifetime undertaking. This idea of development is in keeping with Aristotle’s and
Aquinas’s theories of virtue ethics. However, within CVE theory, making progress with
any and every other virtue is based on the continual development of the central virtue of
care. The excellence in each virtue is rooted in the excellence of care at any stage of an
individual’s life. Each of the other virtues is developed at different paces, for different
people, depending on the events in their lives. The way to understand how care functions
in this role is found in Aquinas’s notion of charity.
God gives charity to an individual.1 Charity is the love of God and neighbor. A
person with charity can still be considered virtuous to some degree, even though he is
imperfect, because there is charity in all his efforts. In his discussions in Article 13 of the
Disputed Questions on Virtues (DQV) Aquinas explains how charity is not destroyed by
one bad act. Rather, charity is only lost when a person turns completely away from God
or in a sense, gives up any attempt to be charitable (to love God).2 Jean Porter, in a
footnote to an article in which she discusses the problem of understanding what unites the
virtues, or is common to all of them, observes that “Aquinas allows for a great deal more
1

Aquinas uses the terminology of ‘infusing’ charity into an individual. See discussion in
Williams, Thomas Aquinas Disputed Questions on Virtues, 66-69.
2

Aquinas’s discussion is more theological. He is concerned with mortal sin, which represents a
serious offense against God, versus some of the lesser sins. See discussion in Williams, Thomas Aquinas
Disputed Questions on Virtues, 190-193.

61

actual imperfection on the part of those who are virtuous through grace, than those who
are virtuous through their own labors.”1 An individual can make some mistakes and still
have charity, thus he would still be considered virtuous. An Aristotelian type of virtuous
person must have all the virtues and not take any unethical actions to maintain the status
of virtuous agent. Aquinas allows for flexibility in this aspect of virtue because he has
set the bar higher. His goal is the saintly individual, united with God. The imperfect
human can still love God, while struggling to be ethical in earthly life. In a similar
manner, an individual with the virtue of care may not have fully developed all, or any, of
the other virtues in an Aristotelian sense. To help separate the notion of what it means to
be a virtuous agent within the CVE theory, I will utilize the term virtuoso human. If a
person has a properly developed virtue of care, for her at any particular stage and place in
her life, she would be a virtuoso human. In following Aquinas, the virtuoso human
would continue to develop care, no matter what mistakes she made in life. As long as she
had the virtue of care she would be virtuous. The term virtuoso human also carries
another important connotation about how an individual becomes virtuous. I will provide
a brief introduction of the idea of a virtuoso human here because it is important to keep
this notion in mind as I develop the notion of care. I then conclude my thesis with a more
definitive description. As a notion, it follows the parallel Aristotle draws between virtue
and skill.
As Aristotle explains it, a virtue is similar to a skill or craft. The problem of
ethics, as I have described it, is that there are no clear cut answers to use in specific
ethical situations. Aristotle compares ethics to the areas of health or navigation, where
1
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“the agents themselves must consider in each case what the opportune action is” (1104a510). There is a certain knack involved which needs to be applied to the situation.1
Generally someone who becomes very skilled in an area, like medicine or music, starts
with some inherent ability. An exceptionally talented piano player generally has some
level of musical ability which she appears to be born with. Training, education and
practice draw out this talent. As the talent is pulled out, it develops and with enough
work, she could excel to the level of virtuoso performer. The virtuoso performer is
considered extremely skilled at her particular craft. However, not everyone has a
musical, medical or other innate talent which can be developed to some level of
excellence. However, every human has the ability to care. This is central to the CVE
thesis.

First Principle
A basic premise or first principle of CVE theory is that everyone has some
measure of the ability to care. They are born with it as a form of good inside them. This
is to some degree a normative claim. However it requires no more than claiming that an
individual exists, and that she has some inherent or instinctive desire to continue
existence. This desire is found in the notion that she cares about her existence and
sustaining her life. This inherent desire to continue existing is the first principle of the
three component parts of the concept of care. This three part form of care is a natural
ability within every human. It can be drawn out of anyone and developed to a level to
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which any person can become a virtuoso human. Through care, a person could excel at
being human at each stage for her life. Furthermore, everyone has the opportunity to
perform ethical acts. Repeated ethical actions based on care determine dispositions. The
care which goes into ethical actions creates the dispositions which become the virtues.
One of the most important elements of ethics is the care we give to our children in
drawing out this initial talent or caring capacity. In this regard, children can begin to put
care into their actions at a very early stage in life and thus develop caring dispositions.
Developing caring dispositions can occur long before any advanced level of reasoning
begins. As Aristotle states in Book X of the NE, “the soul of the student needs to have
been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like ground that is to nourish
seed” (1179b25-26). The next step in CVE theory is built on developing the care we give
to ourselves and others.

Care as a Foundation
The purpose of my thesis is to outline the foundation and structure of a full theory
built on the thesis and principles of CVE theory, which I have just briefly introduced.
Much of this outline will be centered on how care can fulfill the foundational role of
Aquinas’s notion of charity. There are many similarities between care and charity. Each
of these concepts can be viewed as an emotion, a disposition and in a central role in an
ethical theory. The first parallel between charity and care is found in that they are
emotions which are similar in nature. Charity is the love of God. In one sense of the
word, to care for someone expresses an emotional connection which could be considered
a weaker form of love. Care is an emotion felt toward someone or something. To love
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someone contains some level of caring. They both can also be construed as dispositions
around the emotion. An individual is considered charitable, in Aquinas’s sense, if she
loves God from a firm and unchanging state. A person is caring if they care for others
from a caring disposition. Finally, the foundational sense of charity relates to the role it
serves as in Aquinas’s theory. It encapsulates his theology. Morality in human life is
ordered toward God in Aquinas’s theory, through the love found in charity. The love in
charity becomes the connection between God and an ethical action involving another
person. This is the conception of charity (love) as foundational in Aquinas, focused on
the ethics involved in human interaction. Humans have an emotional bond with God
which is expressed in charitable action toward neighbor. Aquinas has what might be
visualized as a straight between an ethical action, the love of God and the love of
neighbor. The three interconnected concepts which I develop for care, instinctive,
maternal and relational, provide a similar foundational principle of a care-based virtue
ethics theory. Humans have an emotional bond with others which is expressed in care.
Care has a straight line at the point of the ethical action, which is caring for another
person. But the line has three prongs at the other end, which are instinctive care for one’s
own life, care for the life provided as represented in the maternal notion of care, and care
for others found in relational care. A part of all three of these is incorporated in an
ethical action. In order to explain this conception, I need to first refine and further
develop the notion of care.
The concept of care, like charity, has a number of different connotations. This is
the starting point for developing a conception of care which is an emotion, virtue and can
serve as the foundation for an ethical theory. The concept of care is fairly broad in its
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definition and even more so in its everyday use. A look at a dictionary will provide a
good idea of how generally the word care can be used. With the notion of care, there is
the idea of a person being troubled or having anxiety regarding someone or something.
This definition of care comes from the notion of feeling interest or concern about
something. Furthermore, this feeling can have an active component, where a person then
wants to do something about the object of care, to relieve what is troubling or change the
situation. Care also connotes the responsibility, burden for, or watchful attention to
someone or something. A person may be charged with the care of an elderly relative or
of a valuable item. This definition of care can also contain the active component of doing
something for someone else. Care can be more passive in its definition, such as the care
directed at a thing that is the object of attention or concern. Care can further be construed
as a fondness or enjoyment of something, as in caring for the taste of a particular food. In
this context, value can be assigned to the object of care. In the common vernacular, it is
even considered a synonym for, or a component of, prudence. I will return to the
relationship between care and prudence. This relation parallels that of charity and
prudence. In its usage related to prudence, a person may be warned to take care, by
which is meant that she needs to be prudent in her action. To take care not to make a
mistake in a given action, can be construed as being prudent. Alternatively if a person is
prudent, they are considered to have taken proper care in their actions. In order to
compare care to charity it will be necessary to narrow the definition of care.
The starting point for developing the meaning of care to be used in CVE theory is
the concept as defined by Nel Noddings in Caring, a feminine approach to ethics and
moral education (1984). Her approach involves an emphasis on both the relational and
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the naturalistic aspects of ethics. Noddings acknowledges the many different uses of the
word care but composes her central definition of care in a manner which has similarities
to the way Aquinas clarifies and narrows his use of the concept charity. She starts by
describing care as an emotion “in the deep human sense” and inside of which a person
can “feel a stir of desire or inclination.”1 It is one of the prime movers of a human.
Throughout her work she emphasizes the power and importance her notion of care carries
in human endeavors and in ethics. She construes care as the first “enabling sentiment”
without which there can be no “ethical sentiment.”2 It is the human longing for relational
caring “that provides the motivation for us to be moral.”3 Noddings argues that ethical
caring arises out of natural caring. Ethical caring is found in the relation in which we
“meet the other morally” and where we respond to the other as one who cares “out of
love or natural inclination.”4 This human condition of natural caring is perceived as
good. Noddings’s natural care is one of the three interrelated definitions to care which
she uses. All three definitions carry with them a sense of care which includes a sense of
this love or natural inclination. Her three definitions of care are maternal care, instinctive
care and relational care.
The intensity of Noddings’s notion of care is first expressed in her discussion of
maternal care. This is her strongest version of care, and it is found in the bond between
mother and child. This maternal care also contains the notion of a naturalistic caring
instinct. A mother’s responsibility to take care of her own child is not only considered a
1

Noddings, Caring, a feminine approach to ethics and moral education, 9.

2

Ibid., 79.

3

Ibid., 5.

4

Ibid., 4-5.

67

moral requirement, it is considered something natural and normal. Maternal care
embodies such an important obligation, that a “woman who allows her own child to die
of neglect is often considered sick rather than immoral.”1 This bond between a mother
and child is the product of both a physical and emotional connection. Every human spent
the first few months of his or her life, as part of his or her mother, another human being.
In this stage of life the unborn child and the mother share everything physically, and the
child is wholly dependent on this one other person. During this period a very strong bond
is created between the mother and child, in the form of an instinct or memory, which is a
naturalistic grounding for the mother-child relationship. This bond, and the memory
created, also provides an example to an individual of the connection and bond he should
have with others. Noddings expresses what she sees as the intensity of this relationship
in that mothers “quite naturally feel with their infants.” 2 A mother does not project onto
her child or interpret his internal thoughts as commands or requests for help, but simply
feels the infant’s feeling as her own.3 A mother cares for her child in the internal sense of
an emotional bond so that in one sense of maternal care, a mother has an attachment or
feeling toward her child which is love. However, the maternal caring for a child also
carries the sense of physically taking care of the child. In terms of the human animal
instinct, this sense of caring could be considered care for the survival of the offspring and
the species.
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Noddings’s second definition of care is instinctive care. It is a part of maternal
care as it relates to the physical care of a child and the infant’s survival. The notion of
care is not something confined to the human animal. It is something which appears to
reside in a variety of animals. A sense of care is found in animal nature and thus is not
postulated simply to address human behavior and human emotion. The instinctive nature
of care can be observed at a very early age in humans. A child shows the capacity for
love, tenderness, feeling and reciprocation of the love received “long before the capacity
for sustained reasoning develops.”1 Noddings postulates that the child is responding to a
natural inclination, and in some instances this response could even be construed as
altruism. The instinctive aspect of care is an observable animal behavior and Noddings
argues that defining care this way is not simply anthropomorphic. It is true that humans
add both the emotional content and the value component to naturalistic caring. This
content added care is an expanded notion of caring which is generally applicable to
human relations. However, basic instinctive caring is shared with the animals and is part
of the human animal.
The depth of the instinctive aspect of care is captured in comments made by Jack
Miles, regarding Noddings’s notion of caring, in that her “deeply original book shows us
how to think afresh about this most primeval of human relationships.”2 The primeval
nature of care is an important component in Noddings’s work. She ties the activities
associated with the internal states of caring in a human, to human animal nature, through
a connection to behavior observed in animals. In this sense she argues that care may be
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construed as inherent and instinctive. An animal will care for, nurture and protect its
offspring. The same type of caring instinct which is exhibited toward an offspring can be
observed in the caring for oneself in the desire for survival. The instinctive care for
survival can be seen in an infant fighting an illness at birth or an adult having an
instantaneous reaction to life threatening danger.
While Noddings construes the primeval, instinctive description of care to be a
deeply rooted part of human nature, she is aware of the problems associated with
considering the human response of caring as instinctive. However, she argues that this
concern is misguided and is a linguistic problem inherent in using the term instinct in
relation to the broader, more complex notion of human relational caring. Her claim is
that “the impulse to act on behalf of the present other is itself innate.”1 She describes
natural caring as something which “lies latent in each of us, awaiting gradual
development in a succession of caring relationships.”2 The main element of Noddings’
concept of care is built around this relational aspect of care.
Noddings is primarily focused on relational care and her main notion of caring
starts with the connection to others. Therefore she does not spend much time discussing
the instinctive notion of care or exploring how it appears implicit in the human desire to
survive. However, she does briefly discuss how caring for oneself emerges from
relationships and caring for others. She goes on to point out that without the initial caring
for one’s self, the realities of others “as possibilities for my own reality would mean
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nothing to me.”1 In her account of care she states that an individual’s ability to care first
requires some measure of self-knowledge in that “knowledge of what gives me pain and
pleasure, precedes my caring for others.” 2 Comments like this in Noddings’s discussion
of care sound similar to passages in Aristotle. For example, at one point he states that
“virtues are concerned with actions and feelings; but every feeling and action implies
pleasure or pain; hence, for this reason too, virtue is about pleasures and pains”
(1104b14-16). However, Noddings is careful to try to distance parts of her work from
Aristotle’s notions of virtue.
In the first printing of her text, Noddings specifically states that she does not want
to contextualize care as a virtue. She wants to stress that the relationship between the
care giver (one-caring) and the recipient of care (cared-for) is ontologically basic. She
believed that focusing on the virtues in an individual places too much importance on the
person. The emphasis in her work is on the caring relation, so that “caring is a
relationship that contains another” and that the “one-caring and the cared-for are
reciprocally dependent.”3 Her emphasis on the relationship is so strong that in order to
emphasize it she states that if “the recipients of our care” believe that nobody cares then
“caring relations do not exist.”4 Nodding’s notion of relational care requires a direct
caring relationship between two people who know each other, interact with each other,
and become united in their caring relationship. The two individuals involved need to
know they are in a caring relationship. She also states that she builds her notion of
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relational caring from two sentiments. She classifies the first sentiment, found in the
maternal and instinctive caring sentiments, as the “sentiment of natural caring” which is
the “initial, enabling sentiment.”1 This is based on “the natural sympathy human beings
feel for each other.” 2 The second sentiment is “the longing to maintain, recapture, or
enhance our most caring and tender moments.”3 In some regard this second sentiment is
also in “remembrance of the first.”4 It is from these two sentiments, which are internal to
an individual, that her ethical ideal springs. The ethical ideal is the proper balance of
caring for others and self which is formed as a “vision of best self.”5 While caring does
deal with feelings and sentiments, she is clear to emphasize that she is not concerned with
the internal development of the concept of care as a virtue, at least not in the traditional
sense. However, in comments she makes in the 2003 reprinting of her book, she believes
that in reviewing her work anew and in light of the many comments from others, it is
obvious that the way she describes care, it can be taken both in the relational sense and as
a virtue. It is the notion of care as a virtue to which I will now turn.

The Virtue of Care
In “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics” (2003) Rata Halwani argues that the concept
of caring, as developed by Noddings, should be given the status of a virtue and should
hold a prominent place in virtue ethics. She thinks this can be accomplished by
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expanding on Noddings’s definition of care. Halwani’s argues that it is possible to define
care as a virtue and then find a place for it within a virtue ethics theory. She believes that
it may not be possible for care to “be the sole foundation” of an ethical theory.1 This
conclusion is due in part to her concern with the fact that she also believes that “the status
of care ethics (CE) as a moral theory is still unresolved.”2 While care ethics may not
develop into a standalone theory, Halwani’s wants to see that the ethical concept of care
continues to be developed. Her challange is to find “a theoretical framework within
which CE can be appropriately housed.”3 I believe care can be the primary foundation of
a virtue ethics theory. However, I concur with her position that care cannot be the sole
foundation of an ethical theory because, just as is the case with charity, care needs
prudence as part of the foundation of the theory. Prudence must maintain its role because
at the heart of ethics is the fact that “in the last resort every individual act must be the
product of the individual judgment of each individual.”4 An ethical theory must not only
give every person instructions regarding the right thing to do (and in some theories the
right intention to have), but it must provide every person with a way to take action. In
virtue ethics action occurs though the use of practical wisdom. Prudence and care can
work together as the central virtues in CVE theory.
Halwani addresses Noddings concern that care shouldn’t be construed as a virtue
because then we pay too much attention to our own characters, rather than focusing on
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relationships.1 Noddings has a very narrow focus on caring relations, which she argues
exist solely between individuals who have a direct relationship. Noddings’s focus is on
the direct connection and thus she rejects the notion that a person can care for everyone,
at least not in the sense she intends it. Nodding’s notion requires the acknowledgement
or appreciation of the caring by the cared-for. Thus as Noddings construes care, someone
cannot care for a person they will never meet or with whom they will never directly
interact. She also argues that an individual cannot care for non-human things such as
animals or plants, which are incapable of returning the sentiment. Halwani argues that
Noddings’s notion of care can be expanded to a much broader concept. Care can be a
broad based virtue, which can account for caring about anyone, caring for a variety of
ethical issues, or caring about a specific situations which an individual might encounter.
Halwani starts by identifying a virtuous person as someone who is not simply concerned
with relations, but “one who is concerned with her character and her life: she is someone
who cares that she maintains an ethical character and that her dealings with others are
moral.”2
Halwani describes caring as a virtue in a more Aristotelian sense, as a disposition
to care not only specifically about someone, but about a variety of things. While
Noddings describes care as an emotional reaction to another person, the broader
emotional area Halwani describes is related to human emotions such as concern, feelings
of interest or liking. The disposition of care deals with an emotional arena or a sphere of
action, in a fashion similar to how courage deals with fear. She argues that Noddings’s
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narrow relationship-based caring meets all the criteria of an Aristotelian virtue. Caring is
obviously a state which “would dispose the agent to act given the right circumstances.”1
Care also involves choice and it is “ultimately up to the agent to decide” whether or not
to care in any given situation.2 Caring also admits of a mean or Aristotelian type of
excellence which, as Halwani indicates, was initially developed in Carol Gilligan’s book
In a Different Voice (1992).
A key part of Gilligan’s thesis is that a morally mature person must have the right
balance of caring in her life. A person develops her moral maturity in three steps. In the
beginning she cares only for herself. At the next level she cares excessively for others to
her own detriment. Finally she reaches the highest level of maturity. At this highest
level, she finds the appropriate balance of caring for herself and caring for others.
According to Gilligan, once a person reaches moral maturity, she develops a concept of
goodness that incorporates the demands placed on her by others and that also accounts for
her own self-worth. She finds the mean or excellence in care in her actions. In this mean
of care “the disparity between selfishness and responsibility dissolves.”3 Gilligan’s
account is an explanation of moral maturity, rather than of an Aristotelian notion of
virtue. However, her account does demonstrate a form of harmony in the individual with
a proper caring disposition. She also describes a continuum on which an individual can
find the mean of the virtue of care.
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Halwani uses Gilligan’s work in developing the transition from Noddings’s notion
of care to an Aristotelian virtue of care. Care falls within the realm of the feeling of
caring or concern. It is a disposition to which humans can be either well or ill disposed.
An individual could care too little or too much about something or some person. Halwani
states that caring admits of an Aristotelian mean. Just as with the other virtues, caring
can be done right, as Aristotle describes the mean, or it can be done wrong:
one can care for the wrong person (for example a morally corrupt
one); one can exhibit care at the wrong time (for example attending
to X whereas it is Y, a stranger, which needs the attention at the
time); one can exhibit care about the wrong thing (for example
supporting a project that should not be supported); one can care for
the wrong reasons (for example I give you chocolate because I
want you to stop crying); and in the wrong way (for example I
calm your fears by lying to you). 1
Described in the form Halwani uses here, care can be put on an Aristotelian type of
continuum in order to determine the mean of the virtue and the vices of the emotion of
care.
A deficiency of care on one end of the continuum could be described as total
apathy, which would entail a feeling of absolutely no interest or concern. It could be no
concern for the well being of anyone else or apathy for an almost any moral situation
with which a person is faced. A person might not even be concerned with his own
happiness, well being or general survival. On the other end of the continuum, the excess
might be an obsessive disposition. It might be an overly controlling person who cares
about every detail in his life, the lives of others around him or every moral dilemma
which arises. He may obsessively care, worry and be concerned with everything, in an
emotional state which encroaches on some form of paranoia or neurosis. The extremes of
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the continuum are very negative, unethical dispositions. One may be called excessive
apathy and the other extreme neurosis. The vice in an action would be too much care, or
to little care, for a specific situation, in the direction of either extreme.
Halwani concludes that caring is “an excellence because, simply, it is a good trait
to have.”1 It is a proper concern for the whole world around a person, which motivates
her to ethical action. Action is taken both with the proper feeling of care and with the
proper reasoning from prudence. The closest virtue to care in Aristotle’s NE is
friendship, which has some components which sound like care. Aquinas addresses
friendship and at one point even construes charity as “a kind of friendship with God.” 2
There is a similarity with friendship in that care is considered a trait needed for
flourishing because “without proper care human beings cannot generally grow up to lead
mentally and emotionally healthy lives.”3 Halwani obviously takes the importance of
care to be much greater than friendship. She states that the lack of care could strike “at
the heart of the agent’s flourishing qua human being” both from the lack of intimate
relationships and the general lack of sociality.4 Considering some of Aristotle’s
comments on politics he might also have concurred with this sentiment. Humans need
others. A flourishing person is not “a solitary person by himself, living an isolated life”
but someone who has the need of “parents, children, wife, and, in general for friends and
fellow citizens, since a human being is a naturally political [animal]” (1097b7-12).
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Care and Charity
The notion of the virtue of care which I have been developing can play a role
similar to that which charity serves in Aquinas’s theory. I will approach this comparison
of care and charity from several different angles. The parallels between care and charity
tend to center around three areas, upon which I will build the correlation. The first is
how the relationship with the mother, found in care, parallels the relation with God,
found in charity. The second is the similarity between the instinctive nature of care and
the primacy of charity. Finally, there are aspects of care which mirror the component of
charity which deals with the relations between people.
The first connection between charity and care is found in the bond between a
mother and her child. This starts during the gestation period, when the child is part of the
mother. This notion of care is a primeval, naturalistic bond between humans, which is
best exemplified in the power of the relationship between a mother and her child.
Noddings states that this maternal caring locates the motivation for morality in the “preact consciousness.”1 Her discussion gives this conception of care immense strength,
similar to the love in charity, which is the powerful bond of love between a person and
God. Part of the Christian ethic is the notion that the love directed to God originates in
the fact that God created humans. God gave humanity existence and humans desire to
reunite with God. It is charity “which makes the soul long to be with Christ” or to “be
joined with God.” 2 Aquinas builds his virtue ethics on charity as the disposition of the
love of and from God, so that through it, a person expresses this love in the actions she
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takes in her life. Aquinas states that people possess the “created disposition of charity
which can be the formal principle of an action of love.”1 Noddings’s care is described
with a similar strength to the love in charity. Maternal care is so strong that “motherhood
is the single greatest source of strength for the maintenance of the ethical ideal.”2
An additional correlation between maternal care and charity is to be found in the
connection that Aquinas draws between higher order love and charity. Charity is the love
of God which humans receive in a finite way, and thus is a created thing in humans. He
construes the love God has for human beings as a perfect love. Charity is a less perfect
version of this love. A similar relation could be seen in Noddings claims about care. The
intense love a mother has for her child could be considered a higher order or more perfect
kind of caring. Care can also consist in lesser forms of the maternal bond of care. Her
ethic is based on the caring relationship, primarily between two human beings, associated
with things like caring and tender moments and she states that a person does “not need to
love in order to care.”3 A person can care for many people and things with intensity
much less than this powerful maternal care. This parallels Aquinas’s rendition of the
relationship between God’s love and the lower order human love found in charity. An
individual cannot have the same level of intensity in the love he has for others, as he has
for God. However, the love of God is to be reflected in the love of others. Likewise, the
care between a mother and child is to be reflected in the care for others.
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The conception of the virtue of care in CVE theory starts with the highest order
human care, found in the bond between a mother and her child, and it then moves to a
lower order of care. As an individual develops the virtue of care, her goal is to strive to
develop the higher level of maternal care in other relations and in all the moral actions
she takes. What is important and different about this notion of care is that it is universal.
Everyone has a mother. This is a simple idea and it has some interesting offshoots worth
exploring. The most important one is to build on Aristotle’s thoughts regarding the
importance of early childhood development. In this early development lies the
opportunity to give the virtue of care to a person. Aquinas has the notion within his
virtue ethics theory that God infuses charity into a person. A mother and the caregivers
in a child’s life have the opportunity to instill the virtue of care into an individual from
the earliest moments of his life. As Noddings points out, the bond of care not only goes
from the mother to the child, but also goes from the child to the mother based on the
remembrance of the early care a person receives in life.
The second relation between care and charity is found in the primacy of both
sentiments. Charity is something which humans are given and in that sense it becomes a
part of their nature.1 Charity is the virtue of the will. It is the will which moves reason to
seek the good and thus precedes reason. Reason presents something it perceives as good
to the will, and the will moves the body to obtain what is presented to it by reason. The
will is moved by charity to seek the good and the will then moves reason, so that in this
sense charity is primary. Care also plays a primary role. The first actions of an infant
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come from his desires and appetites. Repetition of these initial actions can generate
dispositions. Noddings argues that these initial emotions include a strong sense of care.
She emphasizes the importance of the emotion, by reference to Hume’s discussion of the
role emotions in general play in ethics. Hume argues that ethics is rooted in feeling or
emotion and the “final sentence” on matters of morality is “that which renders morality
an active virtue.” – “…this sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which
nature made universal in the whole species, for what else can have an influence of this
nature.”1 Care is an instinctive, universal human emotion, something humans have as a
part of their animal nature. It is internal, but it is not caused by the subject. Aquinas
expands Aristotle’s naturalistic theory to include a God that infuses charity into a human
life. Care, in place of charity, can take this role, but is something a person has as part of
their human nature. This makes CVE a self contained naturalistic theory. In a way, care
is a better fit with Aristotle’s naturalistic theory, filling the need Aquinas perceived for a
grounding principle, but better maintaining the integrity of Aristotle’s naturalistic theory.
As Noddings has pointed out, the notion of care, as an animal instinct, develops in a child
before he has the capacity to reason. Care is a primeval human instinct. Care moves the
moral reason to seek the good, as Aquinas argues that charity does. In this capacity, care
is the virtue of the will and provides the volition for action.
As an instinctive capacity, care can provide a strong foundational root for virtue
ethics. The naturalistic sense of caring can be easily extended to something which is
considered a common human characteristic. It also is universal in its maternal form,
since every human being at one point in his or her life was cared for by another. Further,
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as a universal human characteristic, it would certainly seem plausible to take as a premise
the idea that every human being cares about something or someone. Through care, as
part of a person’s inherent nature, he will naturally consider the “natures, ways of life,
needs and desires”1 of others. This discussion leads to the final comparison between
charity and care, which is in the area of human relations.
Relational care builds on the foundation of both the maternal and naturalistic
aspects of care. Care is not an abstract rational principle or a divinely inspired love of
neighbor. What makes care such a powerful foundational ethical principle is, as
Noddings puts it, the fact that the caring “regard for beings is not derived from a concept
of ‘respect for persons’; rather, it furnishes the foundation for such views.”2 Every
individual human being’s existence depends on someone else caring about him or her.
Without the caring relationship no one would exist. At the most basic level, physically,
without some relationship between a man and a woman, followed by someone caring for
children, no one would exist. From the moment a person comes into existence, at
conception, someone needs to care for him in order for him to survive. This starts with
the mother carrying the child, through the gestation period up to birth. Someone needs to
care for the individual through his upbringing, until the point he can survive on his own.
The initial intimate relationship of co-existing between the mother and the fetus provides
a physical and emotional bond which is the naturalistic grounding for Noddings’s claim
that the love between a mother and child is fundamental in ethics. The individual has a
memory of the caring provided by those who brought about her existence and helped
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sustain her. This is the remembrance of the receipt of care, which may be construed as a
sentiment or a cognitive memory. This sentiment or memory helps develop the portion
of the virtue of care which underlies the relational caring for others.
As discussed earlier, Noddings focuses primarily on the direct caring relationship.
Her sentiment could be taken in a similar context as Aquinas, when he states that “charity
does not recognize different degrees between the one who loves and the one who is
loved, because it unites the two.”1 Care unites people in the caring relationship, as
charity unites people through the loving relationship, as mediated through God. These
sentiments of Noddings, and Aquinas’s concepts of relational care, require further
elaboration. There are ideas in Aquinas’s discussion of charity which can be of benefit in
expanding Noddings’s conception of care.
Aquinas extends the love of God in charity to others, so that a person’s “neighbor
is loved only for the sake of God.”2 However, Aquinas does not limit this obligation to
just others with which an individual has a direct relationship. Aquinas quotes
Augustine’s concerns that a person should “care most for those who are nearest to you”
in a special way, however a person should not “exclude those who are not connected to
us by any particular tie, as, for example, those living in India and Ethiopia.”3 Jean Porter
provides some important insight into this aspect of Aquinas’s structure for charity.
Contrary to the general conception of Christian love “Thomas denies that charity as
neighbor love requires each of us to love all our neighbors equally.”4 Porter draws on an
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analysis of Aquinas’s more indepth discussion of charity in the Summa Theologiae. She
concludes that he has an explicit hierarchal order to the love found in charity. Of course
God is to be loved above all else. However, Aquinas also argues that “each person
should love himself or herself more than his or her neighbor.”1 The notions of charity are
based on the Christian bible and a key component of this discussion comes from that
source. After the commandment to first love God, comes the second commandment that
“you shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments the whole law is
based.”2 The law referred to here is the Christian moral law. Aquinas goes on to discuss
how some neighbors are to be loved more than others. He even develops an extensive list
for the order of loving different groups of people. Aquinas holds the precept that it is
acceptable to love in different degrees those in different circumstances. 3 This broadened
version of charity applies to everyone, so that “no one is excluded from charity, or from
the scope of the perpetual willingness to serve the neighbor that charity includes.”4 The
hierarchal aspect of charity is something which needs to be added to Noddings’s narrow
notion of relational care. As previously discussed, this is an observation which Halwani
made and an area of Aquinas’s work from which CVE could greatly benefit. Noddings’s
conception of care needs to be extended.
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In arguing for a broader notion of care, Halwani addresses the problem with
Noddings’s notion of care. She uses the example of two siblings or friends who care for
each other, even though they are physically separate from each other and have no direct
contact over time. Halwani argues that such relationships are caring and thus believes
that this component must be added to Noddings’s care. Halwani believes that “it would
seem that Noddings’s account is at best incomplete” because she does not think these
indirect relationships are caring.1 Halwani also points out that, while Noddings argues
that the relationship is primary, she argues that it “difficult to see how human
relationships can be ontologically basic when they conceptually require human beings”
to exist in the first place in order for people to form the relationships.2
To fulfill the role of charity, the virtue of care must be expanded to allow for the
general area of care for other people with whom the agent is not in direct contact. To
serve as a foundational principle of a virtue ethics theory, is also necessary that a person
care about other living things, such as animal life, plant life, and even inanimate objects,
as well as ideas, thoughts, and activities. All of these are a part of the field of concern in
ethics. As a core virtue, care can account for any valid area of ethics. Noddings’s
concept of direct relational care could easily be accommodated within Aquinas’s
hierarchy. Caring for those with whom a person has direct relations can be a higher level
of care. However, it does not preclude care of others. An individual must care for
himself and his own existence. A person first learns about care through the care he
receives from others for his survival. An individual’s ability to care first requires some
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measure of self-knowledge. It is important for a person to care for himself. The
Christian notion of love of self, equal to love of neighbor, can be easily applied to the
virtue of care.
In summary, the parallels between care and charity represent a very rich area to
explore. Noddings centers her notion of the good around caring, so that “natural caring –
some degree of which each of us has been dependent upon for our continued existence –
is the natural state that we inevitably identify as ‘good’.”1 I believe this sentiment
encompasses instinctive, maternal and relational caring. Charity also has parallels this
idea with its focus on the good of God. In charity an individual cares about others for the
sake of God. In some sense, the care for others is initiated in the maternal care for the
individual and his own existence. It also comes from the memory of the care he received
from others, which was necessary for him to exist.
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Chapter 6: Framework for Care-Based Virtue Ethics
I set out in this thesis to discuss the structure and foundation of a care-based
virtue ethics theory. The initial structure is found in the concepts of Aristotle’s virtue
ethics theory with its focus on action and the development of the dispositions. The next
step is to rework Aquinas’s theory, utilizing much of his expanded Aristotelian structure,
but using the virtue of care in place of charity. Using care in the foundational place of
charity allows for use of many of Aquinas’s theological ideas, but within a more
naturalistic approach. This revised approach includes analysis of aspects of his accounts
of natural law, happiness, prudence and action. This is a significant undertaking. As
Williams indicates in the introduction to the DQV “Aquinas’s ethics is so thoroughly
systematic that one cannot adequately understand any of these accounts without drawing
heavily on all the others.” 1 I will say a few words about how some of these areas might
be addressed in future work.

Care and the Virtues
Substituting care for charity means that care is part of all the virtues. This opens
an avenue of investigation which addresses the question of what it means for care to be
the form, root and moving cause of all the moral virtues. In this sense, the virtues are
considered as forms of care. Courage is considered a form of caring for existence and
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overcoming the fear of death or injury. If a person does not care about her existence, she
will not fear death and thus have no need of courage. Courage might include balancing
care for oneself with care for others who need help or protection. Temperance would be
considered a form of caring about controlling bodily desires. If a person does not care
about moderating bodily pleasures, there would be no need to fight temptation and thus
no need for temperance. Temperance could be born out of caring about health or others
needs. Moderating consumption might mean not consuming more than a person’s share
of goods out of concern for the needs of others. In honesty there might be caring about
the consequences of truth. However, this also opens the possibility of a concern for a
principle, some kind of caring for the principle of truth. A person might be honest
because he cares about what kind of person he is, his reputation or the intrinsic value in
truth. Justice is a rich area to explore. The root of justice might be found in how a
person cares about others and their fair treatment. The notion of concern for other
individuals rights or one’s own obligations could be a form of caring.
Caring about the well being of another person will provide both the motivation
and the form for being kind to him. This might be first thought of in relation to what a
person finds of value and the desires she has for things of value. Before a person desires
something, it must have some significance to her. She must care about it. It is through
caring, in the deeply human sense that has been discussed herein, that a person turns his
attention and desire to an object or other being. Care is the emotion or the feeling which
directs the attentive consciousness in matters of morality. This is a very brief summary
of a very rich area of future exploration.
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The Good
Awareness of and caring about ones’ own existence happens early in life. This is
followed by the realization that a person has a choice in what happens with her life. An
individual who never develops a proper sense of caring for her own life will struggle to
develop an ethical foundation. She must also realize that she needs others, in order for
her to exist. These are others who cared for her in the beginning of her life and for whom
she must care in return. The realization of the need for others initiates prudence.
Prudence focuses on using reason to help maintain a person’s existence, which also
involves other people.
This is consistent with Aquinas’s theory as well. A moral person is motivated by
three broad types of goods. The first two types of goods are “to maintain ourselves in
existence” and to “reproduce ourselves and to care for our offspring.”1 These are
considered goods that humans share to some degree with animals. The third type of
goods belongs to people alone this category “subsumes the other two without superseding
them.”2 The third type of goods is for a person “to exercise the powers of rational
thought and (consequently) to live in society and to know God.”3 It would seem that it
would be a worthwhile effort to take this societal notion of Aquinas’s theory and
reconstruct it based on the virtue of care. His structure and in-depth analysis of human
behavior would greatly strengthen CVE theory. At the same time, replacing charity with
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the virtue of care would help give his theory more universal appeal, with a more
naturalistic foundation.
Because CVE theory is based on Aquinas’s description of placing care in the role
of the virtue of charity, it is important to try to bring the good of Aquinas, which is God,
back to the more naturalistic good of existence. The nature of charity is to love “God for
his own sake” and that loving the other is based on the premise that “God is in him, or so
that God may be in him.”1 Aquinas connects individuals to each other and the good by
reference to the “common good that relates to one person or another qua part of the
whole,” so that the “principal object of love is whatever the good principally resides in”
which is people.2 It is possible to consider a similar relationship with caring about others,
existence and human flourishing.
A person needs to care about her own existence and take prudent action to sustain
it. In addition, she needs others to exist, so at a minimum she must care about other
people out of a concern for her own existence. Without proper self-care, a person will
not care properly for others. Aquinas’s states that “inasmuch as it is necessary for
something to tend towards God, this inclination arises out of charity.”3 In like fashion,
tending toward the good of flourishing existence is an inclination that arises out of care
for existence. Noddings makes a strong argument that natural caring is something which
each person has been dependent on in his life. Natural care is caring for continuing
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existence and reproduction which humans share with animals. An individual has a
natural concern for life and with prudence she can take caring action.
This is a significant area to develop within CVE theory which I touched on
already and am only briefly outlining here. It is important to place good inside of every
human being by nature of their very existence. Caring about existence is connected to the
good of existence. Every human has the ability to be good, simply by virtue of existing
as a human being. Everyone has the capacity to care at a higher level than just the basic
caring for existence. Knowing that she exists, and that she has choices that she can make
about that existence, are the first steps an individual takes toward reasoning. This notion
can be used for educational purposes. Every person has good inside of him or her, in the
form of care. This natural care can be developed and pulled out, like natural musical or
athletic ability. The skills of always caring and always making the best practical decision
possible can be taught and learned through habituation in youth and continued education
and experience. This leads back to the discussion of the concept of the virtuoso human.

The Virtuoso Human
The term virtuoso generally refers to an individual who excels at a fine art. It is a
term usually associated with a musician. A virtuoso violinist excels at the technique of
playing the violin. However, she is more than just technically competent. The virtuoso
performer is engaged in an art form and creates music. The meter and the scale are
technical, each beat and each note standing in a specific relationship to the other. It is
important that the virtuoso violinist be competent in the technical aspects, which takes
time and practice. But there is something more in a great performer than simply the
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collection of notes played at the proper tempo. The virtuoso musician adds something to
the music which is particularly human. When done properly the music somehow
connects to, and touches something inside of the listener. It is also generally thought that
the virtuoso musician needs to have some inherent musical ability or something inside of
her which is drawn out and developed. She has some measure of latent musical ability.
When she reaches the peak of virtuoso ability, it seems that there is something drawn out
of her that also connects to and touches the audience. Like the virtuoso performer born
with some musical ability, the virtuoso human is born with a natural care. However,
those born with natural care are not some select few. Everyone is born with a natural
ability or capacity to care.
Instinctive care is a natural part of every human being. In addition, care is given
to a person in a very special way in the unique caring relationship between a mother and
her child. Every person has some experience of care. It is grounded in both animal and
human nature. It is a universal human capacity. A virtuoso human is an individual who
has had the care drawn out of her and developed from a very young age. As she grows,
she continues to develop the virtue of care. A virtuoso person can possess the proper
virtue of care completely, in relation to the various stages in her life. The caring acts of a
virtuoso person also touch something special in others. There is a connection between
the virtuoso caregiver (caring-one) and the recipient of care (cared-for). The primary
subject of Noddings’s book is this connection. If a person cares in the proper way, it will
“render virtuous activities pleasurable in themselves, so that we can act more easily.”1
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Noddings supplies some perspective on the requirements of a virtuoso human and
provides grounding for the concept. Her thought is different from both Aristotle’s notion
of the virtuous person and the religious aspect that Aquinas adds to the theory. She
stresses the importance of the requirement of attainability. In defining the caring human,
she states that it “is not necessary that I, a concrete moral agent, actually attain my ideal–
surely, I shall fail repeatedly–but the ideal itself must be attainable in the actual world. It
must be possible for a finite human being to attain it, and we should be able to describe
the attainment.”1
A virtuoso human being is someone who not only has the virtue of care, but also
has prudence. He excels at being a caring person and can use practical reason to put the
virtue of care into action. Care is an excellence which can be perfected in a very human
sense as the foundational virtue of character. It may allow for some level of failure,
which can be made up through the effort and future development. It allows for
continuous growth, development and improvement of the morality of the individual.
Excellence in caring is a human perfection at various points in life, never reaching a
specific fixed point. In taking on the role of charity, care like charity “is found not in the
reason but in the will.”2 Care and prudence work together so that care provides the
goodness in a virtue and prudence is what a person uses to take action, in conjunction
with the care in the other virtues. A prudent individual is a person who can “deliberate
finely about things that are good and beneficial for himself…about what sorts of things
promote living well in general” (1140a25-29). The development of the other virtues
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comes from the care in the individual actions a person takes. Care is the root of the
virtues of character. The virtue of care is the moving cause of prudence in the application
of the other virtues. The role of prudence is also critical, because as Aristotle’s states it,
“we cannot be fully good without prudence, or prudent without virtue of character”
(1144b30-35).

Practical Wisdom
An individual can put care into their actions very early in life. As they mature,
they begin to apply prudence as well. Repeated caring actions in various aspects of life
begin to form the dispositions. The proper care in repeated temperate action begins to
form the disposition which will become temperance. The same is true with honesty or
courage. Learning and developing these actions comes from the care of others. A
virtuoso human is one who puts the excellence in care into every action. This is done
with the virtue of prudence. Prudence (Phronesis) is a central part of virtue ethics
theories. It is the primary virtue in Aristotle’s theory. The human good is found in the
human function which “is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason”
(1098a8-9). Prudence is that part of reason which has to do with taking action in life. In
his discussion of wisdom in Book VI of the NE Aristotle lays out the argument for the
importance of prudence. It includes an understanding of all the parts of the situation.
The object of prudence is not theoretical knowledge, but action. This characterization
has some parallels to the approach Noddings takes to care. There appears to be a strong
connection between care and prudence in her work.
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Noddings expresses concerns with relying on theoretical knowledge in dealing
with ethical issues. In discussing her ethical ideal, she clearly points out that it is a
practical notion, not a theoretical exercise. In dealing with ethical issues, a person must
resist the temptation to “soar into clouds of abstraction – where everything but gross
contradiction can be set right.”1 Noddings’s ethical ideal is not made up of “artificial
solutions contrived in a parallel world of abstraction.”2 If an ethical theory is going to be
universally attainable, it must be useful to any individual. Prudence is the virtue which
combines reason and charity in Aquinas’s theory. This same relationship is found
between care and prudence. However, it is possible that care would connect more
directly with prudence than charity does. Charity must go to God to be grounded. God is
an abstract notion. Care is a naturalistic notion. Noddings provides some insightful
comments on this topic, as it relates to ethical action.
Noddings refers to the biblical story of Abraham and his son Isaac. Abraham is
told by God to offer his son as a sacrifice to God. She points to the explanation of this
act by Kierkegaard, who describes Abraham’s action as “justified by his connection to
God, the absolute.”3 Abraham is asked by God to kill in the name of this same God who
says ‘thou shalt not kill’. Abraham was planning to commit this forbidden action because
he believed he heard the voice of God. Abraham was acting based on the abstract,
universal idea of God, the absolute. He chose this path, rather than following a practical
principle, from the same God. This leads to a paradox in his action. Out of a “duty to
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God, we may be required to do to our neighbor what is ethically forbidden.”1 God is the
first principle in Aquinas’s theory. What appears as a direct command from God must be
measured through prudence, which focuses on earthly human goods.
Care in place of charity brings a more naturalistic approach to this problem. As
Noddings explains it, this is a place where intuition goes wrong and Abraham has gone
into the clouds of abstraction. According to Noddings a mother responds to her child, the
human cry, not the abstract voice. This seems more consistent with the functioning of
prudence. As Aristotle describes it, prudence is a virtue concerned with the human
goods. The virtue of care moves the will toward human goods, the most important of
which is human life, which has priority over the abstract. The virtue of care is primary in
CVE theory. Moral action starts with caring about human existence, both an individual’s
existence and the existence of others in the caring relationship. Prudence is then engaged
by care. Aristotle’s intellectual reason is the human connection to the world of abstract
thought and ideas. Aquinas’s notion of charity connects a person to the abstract of God.
Care connects a person to her own concrete existence and the concrete existence of
others. In this capacity care functions as a virtue more fundamental than prudence and
more practical than charity.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
My thesis is intended to be a starting point for further work on the subject of
placing care in a central role in virtue ethics. A fully developed virtue ethics theory
based on care and structured like the theories of Aristotle ad Aquinas seems feasible.
There are many unanswered questions and ideas to continue to explore. The notion of
care which I have developed herein has many similarities to charity. In particular, I
wanted to stress the strength of the notion, its naturalistic origin, the need to care about
one’s own existence, and the care found in relations with others. One of the most
important aspects of care-based virtue ethics theory is imparting the virtue of care to each
subsequent generation.
Instilling care in children is not simply a matter of teaching and developing it as a
virtue. From the very beginning of human life a person must be cared for and cared
about. In pregnancy the mother must care about the child in order to bring it into the
world. During pregnancy the mother and child share everything. Being cared for is the
source of the special bond between a mother and a child, of which Noddings speaks about
and which is at the core of care. Through childhood someone must care for a person,
until he reaches a point where he can care for himself. Noddings captures in her
discussion the remembrance of the early care a person receives in life and how important
that is to his morality. As she developed her notions of relational care, it is the early care
a child receives which establishes the basis for a person to care for others. The effort to
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raise a child is substantial. The acknowledgement and remembrance of this part of a
person’s life, and the care received from others, is a very powerful human sentiment. It
represents a tremendous opportunity to establish a proper ethical sentiment in children.
The opportunity caregivers have to instill care is a powerful starting place for an ethical
theory.
Imagine the loving care which can be imparted on a child during his development.
A person can be given the virtue of care, which then can be developed by that individual
into an appreciation for the care received. This instilled care can then be extended to
others. Of equal importance is the caring appreciation for one’s own worth. Consider the
opposite, a person who does not have appropriate care and is abused. Statistics aren’t
necessary to show that a child who is abandoned, abused, neglected, or given no care
other than cold callous delivery of sustenance, will very likely struggle to develop a
proper morality. Similarly, an adult treated very poorly (who never gains a sense that his
life has any worth and who never cares for his own life in a proper sense) may develop
problems with his morality. An individual must care for himself and his own existence.
A person must also learn to care for his neighbors, as if his very existence depended on
others, because it does.
A person’s existence is dependent on someone else existing before him, his
parents and the others who cared for him. Once he comes into existence, he is dependent
on others for his continued existence, which is based on the notion of relational care. He
should act based on this sense of the virtue of care. Every moral decision and action
should be taken in light of the value of his existence and the equal importance of others
for the maintenance of his existence. The importance of others is not to be construed to
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indicate that others should be considered as means to an individual’s own end. The care
for others must be taken in the context of an interrelated need to co-exist. Each person’s
life has an equal value based on the mutual need for others. However, it obviously starts
with a person caring for his own existence. If an individual does not value his own life, it
is virtually impossible for him to find value in others lives. This is the enabling
sentiment for CVE theory.
There are many aspects of Aquinas’s work which need exploration. The
discussion of caring for existence has some parallels to things found in the ideas of
natural law. The notion of law tends to focus on the idea of justice and a connection to
the laws of nature. A second area to explore would be to understand how care relates to
the locus of natural laws within humans. Aspects of CVE theory could parallel
Aquinas’s natural law theory. His work could be addressed from the perspective of a
similarly construed natural caring theory. Placing care in the position of charity would
then require a discussion of synderesis which “is the disposition containing the precepts
of the natural law, which are the first principles of human acts.”1 It may be possible to
argue that care is a part of synderesis, or that care contains the precepts of natural law, or
that they can be derived from it. A proper review of Aquinas’s overall works in relation
to care would be a next step in this argument for the primacy of care.
The main sentiment I want to capture in this analysis is the idea of grounding and
unifying the virtues in respect to Aquinas’s comment that charity is the form, moving
cause and root of the virtues. I have spoken at some length about ethical theories and
what is special about the virtue ethics that Aristotle and Aquinas describe. Modern

1

Williams, Thomas Aquinas Disputed Questions on Virtues, xii, (Ia2ae 94.I ad 2).

99

ethical theories such as Utilitarianism or Kantianism seem to place the focus of ethics on
some type of measurement or rule based system. Noddings’s work on care was done in
part as a response to problems which come from these modern types of theories. These
two other types of theories can provide any answer so long as the math works, or there is
some logical non-contradictory argument, or abstract rule or principle to support a course
of action. Noddings argues that the modern focus on these types of theories gives ethics
not only a “mathematical appearance, but it also moves discussions beyond the sphere of
actual human activity and the feeling that pervades such activity.”1 In a sense, these
other two approaches to ethics seem to move the foundation of ethics away from people.
Noddings’s care ethics has its foundation in “human caring and the memory of caring and
being cared for.”2 The CVE theory I am proposing can be built upon the three sentiments
of maternal, instinctive and relational care. This is a very promising future avenue for
rich development. Care-based virtue ethics can be learned through habituation which, as
Noddings puts it is “just the repetition of feelings and events in ordinary life” and the
celebration of the “ordinary, human-animal life.”3
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